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Sustainability
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D8.1 Environmental sustainability from below: Public opinions across the Globe

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Abstract

Against the backdrop that most political economies across the globe need to promote transitions towards more environmentally sustainable public policies and economic practices, we ask what factors explain public support for and opposition to such trajectories among people living in different institutional and socio-economic contexts.

To study this, we used survey data on individual attitudes from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2020 module on the environment. The dataset included a random sample of adult population in 28 countries. The analysis was organised in two steps. First, we examined whether improvement in living standards for people should now be prioritised over the preservation of nature for future generations, commonly referred to as the trade-off between economic growth and the environment. Next, we studied public support for and opposition to three specific environmental policy instruments: higher prices, higher taxes and decreased standard of living across numerous countries in the Global South and Global North. The countries differ greatly both in terms of human development, welfare systems and vulnerability to climate change. The motivation is to examine how these variations influence individual priorities in transition processes.

The analysis results showed that the correlation between individual-level variables and pro-environmental attitudes varies across countries, and the results from the regression models were only partially in line with previous literature in this field. Importantly, typical explanatory factors identified in previous studies using data from Europe and North America explain, only to some degree, the variation in attitudes in other parts of the world. The explanatory power of our models is particularly weak in the case of acceptance of environmental policy instruments that facilitate the transition to more sustainable societies in countries with low rankings on the Human Development Index.

1. Introduction

The consequences of climate change are becoming increasingly severe each year, with more frequent occurrences of heat waves, heavy rainfall, droughts and floods impacting peoples' livelihoods, endangering health, and rendering some areas uninhabitable (World Meteorological Organization, 2024). A majority of citizens worldwide recognise the urgency of climate action (Fairbrother, 2022), but they also demand policies that are socially just and economically fair (United Nations Development Programme, 2024b). The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) is central to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the global institutional framework within which international climate negotiations have taken place since 1992. The Paris Agreement embraces the CBDR-RC principle in recognition that countries' 'contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, development needs, and vulnerability to climate change vary greatly' (Pauw et al., 2019). A growing body of research has showed that, while affluent nations and people are responsible for the lion's share of carbon emissions, socio-economically disadvantaged groups are disproportionally affected by the consequences of both climate change and the policies to mitigate it (Büchs et al., 2011). This triple injustice calls for social policies to counteract the regressive distributional effects of mitigation policies.

By combining economic, social and environmental factors, the theoretical framework of the SPES (Sustainability, Performances, Evidence, and Scenarios) project offers an analytical lens to study sustainable human development (Haq, 1995). Productivity, Equity, Environmental Sustainability, Participation and Empowerment and Human Security are the five main pillars around which this framework is centred (Biggeri et al., 2023). These pillars provide communities with a roadmap to address the complex issues of sustainable development to create better futures. However, the relative significance of each pillar might change based on the perceived difficulties and advantages that various individuals and locations encounter. The present report focuses on environmental sustainability and, more specifically, citizens' willingness to bear some of the costs that sustainability transitions entail. Setting countries across the globe on environmentally sustainable paths requires large-scale systemic changes across a range of areas, including energy systems (see Zens et al., 2024), industrial systems (Bashmakov et al., 2022) and individual consumption patterns (Thøgersen, 2021). Public policy plays a fundamental role in inducing such changes. Examples of policy instruments include different combinations of regulations, tax measures and subsidies which are targeted at either businesses or private individuals.

Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)—which, in 2020, focused particularly on the environment, this report analyses public attitudes towards some general policy measures that governments may adopt to promote environmental sustainability. We ask what characteristics explain public support for and opposition to transition policy trajectories among people living in different institutional and socio-economic contexts. To address this, we proceed in two steps. First, we ask what explains the differences in citizens' preferences for improved living standards for people today over the preservation of nature for future generations, commonly referred to as the trade-off between economic growth and the environment. This has been a concern for at least half a century since the important Club of Rome report 'Limits to growth' (Meadows et al., 1972). Next, we analyse differences in public support for and opposition to three specific environmental policy instruments – higher prices, higher taxes and decreased standard of living – across countries in both the Global South and Global North. The countries differ greatly when it comes to standard of living, welfare regimes and vulnerability to climate change. The motivation is to capture how such variation matters for individual priorities in transition processes.

Much research has been conducted on this issue, but most of this research has relied on European data. Our main contribution to the literature is to provide insights from countries beyond Europe.

An underlying assumption of our analysis is that (lack of) public acceptance of transition policies impacts the scope for politicians to enact public policies that facilitate sustainability transitions. As the famous political theorist Robert A. Dahl (1989, p. 95) once pointed out, in liberal democracies, 'citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do'. Individual attitudes influence how people vote in elections, thereby shaping the context in which politicians make policy decisions in a potentially constraining or enabling direction (Cooper & Burchardt, 2022; Powell, 2004). Few studies have empirically investigated whether awareness and concern translate into voting behaviour; however, Hoffmann et al. (2022), in their study across European countries, found that green voting increases with environmental concern. In their study on the relationship between public opinions and environmental policies, Anderson et al. (2017) found that pro-environmental shifts in public opinions increase the adoption of renewable energy policies in a European context.

Despite the environmental and economic benefits of carbon taxation and subsidy reforms, political challenges persist, and the perceived lack of fairness is a key issue. Social conflicts have emerged in response to policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The French Yellow Vest movement's vocal reactions to an increase in carbon tax (Levain et al., 2022) and the violent protests against the removal of diesel and petrol subsidies and doubling of retail prices in Nigeria in 2012 (Lockwood, 2015) illustrate the potential force of public reactions to policies perceived as socially unjust.

In the following section, we provide a brief review of relevant literature, and section 3 describes the ISSP data along with the analytical approach. In section 4, we present our results, and in section 5, we conclude and draw some policy implications.

2. Background

To slow down climate change and move to a society with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, there is a need for a fundamental shift in consumption and production systems. This is commonly referred to as a *sustainability transition* and involves radical changes in socio-technical systems (Elzen et al., 2004). Geels (2004, p. 900) defined socio-technical systems as the 'linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions', such as energy, food and transportation. Changing these systems involves both technological innovations and changes in social practices. Governments can, for instance, regulate, invest and provide economic incentives to change the behaviour of individuals and businesses. However, such government actions come at a cost for some people while benefiting others; therefore, they raise issues of legitimacy and fairness.

2.1 Fairness: Different responsibilities and capabilities

Social inequality and climate change are closely linked. Income is singled out as a main explanatory factor of carbon footprint, both within and across countries (Ivanova & Wood, 2020; Lévay et al., 2021). While the top 10% (richest) individuals were responsible for 48% of global emissions in the period 1990–2019, the bottom 50% contributed only 12% (Chancel, 2022). While North America and Europe must reduce their average per capita emissions to reach the 2030 climate targets, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement acknowledges that it will take longer for emissions to peak in developing Global South countries (UNFCCC, 2015). In addition to large cross-country differences in emissions, within-country inequalities are also increasing. For example, the total emissions from the bottom 90% of the populations in India and China are below the 2030 target, while those from the richest top 10% are well above (Chancel, 2022, p. 935). The richest quintile in India will have to halve their emissions to reach the target, while the richest quintile in China will have to reduce their emissions by 70%.

While the rich are responsible for the lion's share of the cumulative stock of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, socio-economically disadvantaged groups are disproportionally affected by the consequences of climate change. In addition to higher exposure to environmental risks, poor households typically lack the financial resources and technology to undertake efficient adaptation to protect against severe damage caused by climate change events (Gough, 2017). This is commonly referred to as 'double injustice'. Poorer countries are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change for three reasons (Tol, 2021): they are located in hotter regions, a larger share of their economic activity is in sectors directly exposed to climate change (such as agriculture) and they have a lower adaptive capacity. The economic impacts of global warming are likely to disproportionately affect poorer households within these countries, increasing the within-country income distribution in the future (Gilli et al., 2024).

2.2 The impact of transition policies varies by policy design

Climate change mitigation policies play a central role in the transition to sustainability. While instruments may positively impact outcomes related to the environment, technology and innovation, they are often associated with negative distributional outcomes (Peñasco et al., 2021). Understanding the distributional impacts of policy is crucial to facilitate a just transition. Carbon taxes are recognised as an efficient instrument to change behaviour and reduce emissions (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017). They work to transform systems of production and consumption by inducing technologies that reduce the carbon intensity of production. Depending on their design, carbon pricing and other economic instruments used to mitigate climate change can be regressive and have a disproportionate impact on the poor (Büchs et al., 2011; Dorband et al., 2019; Lamb et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019). While carbon taxes have been implemented to varying degrees across Europe for two decades, they are less common elsewhere (World Bank, 2024). One of the main reasons for the limited application is public opposition. They are unpopular among affected consumers, and concerns exist regarding their distributional impacts, as carbon taxes are generally perceived as placing a greater financial burden on low-income households (Carattini et al., 2018; Drews & Van den Bergh, 2016).

Another policy instrument to increase carbon prices is the removal or reduction of various subsidies on energy production and consumption, such as fossil fuel subsidies. In addition to increasing greenhouse gas emissions (Sovacool, 2017), fossil fuel subsidies impose large costs on public budgets. In 2015, they amounted to an estimated 6.5% of the global GDP (Coady et al., 2017). Hence, removal or reduction of subsidies could make funds available for other desired purposes, such as provision of public health and education services or targeted cash transfers to low-income households adversely affected by the subsidy reform. Generally, fossil fuel subsidies are also regressive, as they disproportionately benefit wealthier households that spend more on energy products, while the costs of these subsidies are distributed equally across the population through public budgets (Arze del Granado et al., 2012). Despite this, subsidies are typically framed as an instrument for poverty reduction and development in developing countries (Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2018). The distributional impacts of subsidy reductions are likely to vary depending on the energy source. In their study of a potential subsidy reform in Ecuador, Schaffitzel et al. (2020) found that removing gasoline subsidies would be highly progressive, as this energy source was primarily used by higher income groups. In contrast, removing subsidies on LPG, which was commonly used by all income groups, would be regressive and contribute to increased inequalities. In addition to the direct effects in terms of higher energy prices, subsidy reforms may affect consumer prices indirectly and increase the price of other goods and services reliant on energy as an input, such as food. Thus, reducing energy subsidies without complementary compensatory policies may have a large impact on the budgets of poor households as well (Schaffitzel et al., 2020; Vagliasindi, 2012).

Equity within the current generation and between current and future generations is at the core of sustainability transitions (Vojnovic, 1995). When policies are regressive and poor households spend a higher share of their income on mitigation costs compared to wealthier households, the concept of double injustice escalates into triple injustice. In such cases, transition policies risk reinforcing existing inequalities or creating new ones (Cook et al., 2012; Schoyen & Hvinden, 2017). Although Lamb et al. (2020) revealed that implemented policies often fail in delivering positive social outcomes, they also found examples of climate policymaking that have delivered on both climate and social goals within a wide array of policies. While carbon taxes impose a cost on individual households, they also generate revenue. If the tax revenues are recycled and transferred

to households through an income-targeted revenue recycling scheme, they may reduce the adverse effects on poor households (Büchs et al., 2011; Feindt et al., 2021; Landis et al., 2021; Vandyck et al., 2023).

2.3 Determinants of public support for transition policies

Willingness to pay for environmental protection varies considerably across countries and over time (Jakobsson et al., 2018). Public support for transition policies is influenced by multiple factors, both at the country and individual levels. In addition, policy design matters. Public attitudes towards subsidy reforms are generally more positive if the use of the saved fiscal revenues is specified (Harring et al., 2023). Similarly, research suggests that public support for carbon taxation is higher when the revenue generated is recycled (Dolšak et al., 2020; Konc et al., 2022).

2.3.1 Country-level factors

There is extensive literature on the relationship between economic development and public opinions on environmental issues and at least two alternative explanations of variation across countries. According to the prosperity hypothesis, environmental protection is not only a collective good but also a 'superior' good in which demand rises with income (Diekmann & Franzen, 1999). Assuming that individuals face a trade-off between consumption of other goods and quality of the environment, higher incomes allow for an increase in both consumption and demand for investments in a better quality environment. Empirical support for the hypothesis is mixed (Fairbrother, 2016). In a study using ISSP data from 1993 and 2000, Franzen and Vogl (2013) found that individuals in more affluent countries had more pro-environmental attitudes. A second potential explanation for variation in environmental concern is that peoples' values shift when they no longer need to devote much of their time to meeting basic needs. Inglehart (1997) has famously described this as a shift from materialistic to post-materialistic. As countries become more affluent and living standards improve, the population is free to pursue post-materialistic goals, such as freedom and environmental protection. Empirical studies have found support for this hypothesis, both across countries (Gelissen, 2007) and across individuals within countries (Fairbrother, 2013).

The quality of institutions is likely to influence governments' ability to commit to and implement transition policies as well as alternative welfare programmes to mitigate the negative social impacts of these policies, thereby affecting public support. In their study of a wide range of national-level fossil fuel subsidy reforms across high-income countries, Droste et al. (2024) found that the quality of institutions and corruption control affect the effectiveness and feasibility of subsidy reforms. Kyle (2018) found that, in Indonesia, citizens perceive the shift from a universally accessible fossil fuel subsidy to a targeted social programme for the poor as less credible in areas where the local governments are corrupt and the resistance to the subsidy reform is higher. In a study across European countries, Davidovic and Harring (2020) found that support for climate taxes is higher in countries with better government quality.

The recognition that ecological and social crises are entangled implies that there is a need for policies that address both ecological and social sustainability (Fritz & Lee, 2023). Social policies have the potential to cushion the adverse economic and social consequences of climate change and make the costs of transition policies less of a burden for socio-economically vulnerable

households (Gough et al., 2008). With a focus on Europe, Zimmermann (2024) argued that pathways to sustainability transitions are linked to the institutional arrangements of existing welfare states. From a global perspective that also includes the Global South, access to social protection is key in reducing socio-economic vulnerabilities in the process of transition to sustainability. The provision of benefits and services, such as income security and access to health care, enhances people's capacity for adaptation and ability to cope with the consequences of climate-related events (ILO, 2024). A further expansion of social protection may increase public support for transition policies and strengthen the popular legitimacy of such policies. The importance of a moderating role of welfare systems for individual attitudes towards environmental action finds some support in the literature. In their study of how insecurity and welfare state generosity affect political support for the environmental action of economically vulnerable social groups across European countries, Parth and Vlandas (2022) found that economic insecurity is a key obstacle to support, and while generosity of the welfare state increases support for individual environmental behaviours, it does not necessarily enhance support for national environmental action. Nordbrandt et al. (2024) also found that more generous social insurance programmes are associated with higher support for carbon tax across European countries, arguing that citizens will be more willing to accept the burden of carbon pricing if they are also adequately protected against the economic risks associated with sickness, old age and unemployment.

2.3.2 Individual-level factors

Pro-environmental attitudes have been identified among individuals with greater knowledge of environmental issues (Hines et al., 1987; Robelia & Murphy, 2012). Numerous studies have found that concern for environmental issues is positively associated with willingness to accept mitigation policies (Bergquist et al., 2022). However, Busemeyer et al. (2020) argued that the degree of salience of an issue is a key conditional factor influencing the importance of public opinion in shaping the direction of policymaking.

Although carbon taxation is considered an efficient and inexpensive policy instrument (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017), it is not necessarily supported by public opinion. A key issue is perceived unfairness, as addressed above. Closely linked to this is the issue of trust. Both political and interpersonal trust impact support for policies such as carbon pricing (Fairbrother, 2016; Harring & Jagers, 2013; Smith & Mayer, 2018). Sustainability transitions require action from the current generation for the benefit of future generations. Fairbrother et al. (2021) found that institutional trust is positively associated with willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of future generations. The associated argument is that respondents' support for transition policies, such as a carbon tax or subsidy reform, depends on their trust in the authorities to design an instrument that will effectively reduce emissions and implement the instrument as promised. Also important is the belief that political institutions will deal with the revenues generated by taxes or funds saved by reducing subsidies in the best interest of the population. Support for mitigation policies is also likely to depend on interpersonal trust and their perception of whether their fellow citizens will cooperate and pay the tax.

In addition to the above-mentioned aspects, socio-demographic factors are also likely to determine public support for transition policies. Overall, meta-analyses reveal insignificant differences in support for transition policies between men and women (Bergquist et al., 2022), but this is likely to vary across regions and countries. In the Nordic countries, for example, women are typically more supportive (Sivonen & Koivula, 2024). With respect to age, public support tends to be higher among younger segments of the population (Bergquist et al., 2022). The more educated people are, the more supportive they tend to be (Fairbrother, 2016). Income is also typically positively correlated

with support (Bergquist et al., 2022; Fairbrother, 2016). In their study across western European countries, Arndt et al. (2023) found that individuals in rural and suburban areas are less supportive of mitigation policies. This is because people in peripheral areas are more likely to fear disruption of local labour markets and income losses due to environmental policies.

3. Data and methods

3.1 Description of ISSP data

Our analysis is based on public opinion data from the 2020 environment module provided by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 2023). The dataset includes responses from 28 countries worldwide, including Austria, Australia, China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and United States. While the ISSP data are global in scope, coverage across global regions is highly uneven. Many European countries have participated in the survey, while there are no countries from South America and only one country from Africa.

The sample size varies between 993 and 4,280 in each country, and the sampling procedures differ. They are designed to be representative of the adult population in each country and range from probability cluster sample, stratified random sample to random sample. The ISSP does not include a population weight variable for international comparison, and there is no common weighting scheme applicable to all countries.[1]

The data were collected between October 2019 and May 2023 and included 44,100 observations. The minimum and maximum ages of the respondents varied across countries due to differences in guidelines. We included only respondents aged 20–75 in our analysis sample to ensure that the same ages are represented across all countries; this reduced the sample by 4,400 observations. In addition, 385 observations were excluded due to incomplete interviews (less than 80% valid answers) and 601 respondents were excluded because of missing answers to one or more of the questions related to the dependent variables. Furthermore, we excluded observations with missing values on background characteristics included in the models. Our final sample included 32,569 observations. A comparison of the full sample and the sample included in the analysis is presented in the Appendix (Table A 2).

3.2 Dependent variables

We aimed to examine the characteristics that explain public support for and opposition to transition trajectories towards more environmentally sustainable societies. First, we analysed the extent to which individuals perceive a tension between the state of the economy and future ecological outcomes. As a measure of this, we used the ISSP item asking respondents how much they agree or disagree with the statement 'We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today'. The respondents answered on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher values indicating more disagreement and thereby more pro-environmental views. While a high share of the respondents in Japan, Sweden and France disagreed with the statement, contrasting results were obtained in Slovakia, South Africa, India, Thailand and the Philippines. An

[1] Summary of weighting procedures in each country provided in the ISSP 2020 Variable Report, pp. 654-655, available from https://www.gesis.org/en/issp/data-and-documentation/environment/2020#c116066

overview of the distribution of responses across the 5-point scale by country is provided in the Appendix (Figure A 1).

Second, we examined the factors explaining differences in individual attitudes towards three specific environmental policy instruments that may be implemented to support transition towards more environmentally sustainable societies. We examined support for higher prices, higher taxes and decreased standard of living. As measures of people's opinions about these instruments, we used the following ISSP items: 'How willing would you be to pay *much higher prices* in order to protect the environment?' 'How willing would you be to pay *much higher taxes* in order to protect the environment?' 'How willing would you be to *accept cuts in your standard of living* in order to protect the environment?'. All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale. In the original ISSP data, the highest value was very unwilling. We reverse-coded the items to ensure consistent directionality of effects, with higher values indicating greater willingness to support the environmental policy instrument. The mean values of attitudes across countries are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Degree of pro-environmental attitudes across countries



3.3 Explanatory variables

Public support for policies was affected by both country- and individual-level characteristics. In addition to the description of variables and descriptive statistics provided in Table 1, an overview of mean values of all explanatory variables by country is provided in Table A 5.

3.3.1 At the country level

Across both countries and individuals within a country, higher income and wealth are associated with stronger pro-environmental attitudes (Franzen & Vogl, 2013). At the country level, we included the HDI score for 2021 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2024a). This is a composite indicator, ranging from 0 to 1, that measures the level of human development in a country with respect to health, education and standard of living. The choice of the HDI as a measure rather than GDP, which measures only economic output, provided a more nuanced and comprehensive view of development and wellbeing, which is crucial when comparing pro-environmental views. It acknowledges the interconnectedness of economic, educational and health factors in shaping a society's approach to environmental issues and is in line with the sustainable human development paradigm underpinning the SPES project (Biggeri et al., 2023).

As a measure of quality of government, we used the indicator proposed by the International Country Risk Guide for 2021 (Teorell et al., 2024), which comprises three components: 'Corruption', 'Law and Order' and 'Bureaucracy Quality'. The variable is scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better government quality. Davidovic and Harring (2020) also used this indicator, and in line with their findings, we expected higher support for climate policy instruments among respondents living in countries with higher values on the quality of government indicators.

Social policies, such as minimum income benefits, unemployment insurance and education and training, can potentially lessen the economic and social costs of climate action on vulnerable households, thereby influencing public support for transition policy instruments. As a measure of the level of welfare policies, we used total public social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the Contextual Database (CDB) of the Generations and Gender Programme (2024)[2]. This share does not include health expenditures.

Experiencing climate-related damages firsthand may increase public support for transition trajectories towards more environmentally sustainable societies. As a measure of vulnerability to climate change, we included the country score in the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative Country Index (ND-GAIN, 2024). The vulnerability score is a measure of a country's exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change, considering six sectors: health, water, food, infrastructure, ecosystem services and human habitat. The variable is scaled from 0 to 1; the lower the value on the index, the less vulnerable the country is to the negative impacts of climate change. We expected citizens of the most vulnerable countries to be more supportive of transition policies.

[2] The exception is the value for China, which is from the World Social Protection Data Dashboards provided by ILO.

3.3.2 At the individual level

Pro-environmental attitudes have been identified among individuals with more knowledge of environmental issues. As a measure of the respondents' perception of the salience of environmental issues, we explored whether the respondents identified the environment as *the* most, or the *second* most, important issue for their country[3]. We also included the respondents' level of environmental concern on a 5-point scale, as well as their educational level (four categories).

Several studies have identified a positive association between institutional and interpersonal trust and support for environmental policies. As a measure of institutional trust, we used the amount of trust the respondent has in the national parliament on an 11-point scale. Furthermore, we used the responses to the question 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' as a measure of interpersonal trust. We dichotomised this variable because China used only four response options, while the rest of the countries used five responses (the mid-value was coded as trust = 1).

Rather than income[4], we used a measure of the respondents' perceived social position in their society based on their self-positioning on a 10-point scale. Based on previous literature, we expect respondents who are better off to be more supportive of transition policies. Other socio-demographic factors may also be associated with support for and opposition to transition trajectories towards more environmentally sustainable societies. We included the respondents' gender and age (in years). Some studies found a u-shaped association between age and environmental attitudes, and that older individuals had stronger pro-environmental attitudes than middle-aged individuals. To account for this, we included a squared term of age in the models. In the separate country models, we also included whether they live in a rural or urban setting (4 categories). This variable was not included for China; thus, it was not included in the pooled model.

An overview of the variables and descriptive statistics for the pooled sample is provided in Table 1. More details on each variable are provided in Table A 1, and descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by country are provided in Table A 3. Support for the environmental policy instrument across countries on the original 5-point scale is presented in Figure A 2–Figure A 4.

[3] In some countries, the data were collected during the Covid-19 pandemic. This is likely to influence the perceptions of the most important issues in each country. When asked to identify the most important issue for their country today, health care was by far the most important issue (Table A 6).
[4] Income missing for more than 10,000 observations, and we choose to use this top-bottom placement instead.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and coding

VARIABLE NAME	DESCRIPTION	MEAN	SD
Dependent variables			
Prioritise the future environment	1 to 5: 1 is strongly agree that we worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today, 5 is strongly disagree	3.18	1.18
Higher prices	1 to 5: 1 is very unwilling to pay much higher prices to protect environment, 5 is very willing	2.92	1.20
Higher taxes	1 to 5: 1 is very unwilling to pay much higher taxes to protect environment, 5 is very willing	2.60	1.21
Reduce standard of living	1 to 5: 1 is very unwilling to accept cuts in standard of living to protect environment, 5 is very willing	2.96	1.20
Explanatory variables at country level			
HDI (N = 28)	Human development index value in 2021, scale 0–1	0.88	0.09
Quality of government (N = 28)	Higher values indicating better quality of government, scale 0–1	0.74	0.18
Social protection exp. (N = 28)	Total public social protection expenditure as % of GDP in 2020	13.99	6.17
Vulnerability (N = 27)	Vulnerability to negative impacts of climate change in 2021, scale 0–1	0.34	0.05
Explanatory variables at individual level (N = 32,569)			
Environmental salience	1 - environment important issue in country, 0 otherwise	0.23	0.42
Environmental concern	Level of environmental concern on a 5-point scale	3.85	1.06
Institutional trust	Trust in the national parliament (0–10)	4.85	2.87
Interpersonal trust	1- most people can be trusted, 0 otherwise	0.65	0.48
Social position	Perceived social position in their society (0–10)	5.53	1.82
Age	Age in number of years	48.1	15.1
Gender	1 if male, 0 female	0.48	0.50
Education	Highest achieved education (4 levels)	2.55	1.35
Urban-rural	4 categories, 1 – big city, 4 – in the countryside	2.69	1.16

3.4 Analytical approach

In the ISSP data, individual respondents (N = 32,569) are nested within countries (N = 28). Although some studies using ISSP and similar datasets have estimated multilevel models, we considered 28 countries to be a very small sample size to be able to estimate reliable country effects (see, e.g. Bryan and Jenkins (2015) for further discussions on applying multilevel models to multi-country datasets).

First, we compared the mean level of support for environmental policies across countries with different country characteristics. We estimated Spearman's correlation coefficients between environmental attitudes and country characteristics. Second, we estimated linear regression models with country fixed effects by including country dummies. The model parameters refer to the total sample of countries, with all observed and unobserved country-level factors being absorbed in the country variables. Third, we ran separate linear regression models for each country, where the model parameters were country-specific and the country effects were absorbed in the intercept of each country-specific model. We checked all models for multicollinearity by estimating the variance inflation factor.

4. Results and discussion

4.1 Descriptive results

Transforming societies to be more environmentally sustainable involves radical changes and requires collective action coordinated at the international and national levels. Although a majority of citizens worldwide recognise the urgency for action (Fairbrother, 2022), public support for transition policies varies by country.

As a measure of attitudes towards the trade-off between economic growth and the environment, we used the ISSP item, asking the respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: 'We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today'. In Thailand, about half of the respondents agreed with this statement. In all other countries, the majority either disagreed or did not have a clear opinion (Figure A 1). To examine public support for climate policies that facilitate the transition to more environmentally sustainable societies, we focused on support for general climate policy instruments. We examined willingness to pay much higher prices, pay much higher taxes and accept cuts in the standard of living in order to protect the environment. In general, support for higher taxes was lower than that for the other policy instruments (Table 2). This was as expected and common across almost all countries included in the analysis. A detailed analysis of the responses in each country showed that, in 11 of the 28 countries, most respondents were very or fairly unwilling to pay much higher taxes to finance environmental protection (Figure A 3).

Before estimating how environmental attitudes are associated with characteristics at individual level, we examined how attitudes vary by country-level characteristics. Overall, the population in more developed countries indicated more pro-environmental attitudes. They were more likely to disagree that there is too much worry about the environment compared to economic factors such as jobs and prices, and they were more positive towards environmental policy instruments that support the transition. This is in line with the theory and previous literature presented in section 2. A possible explanation for this is that there is a shift in peoples' priorities when they no longer need to spend much of their time meeting basic needs.

In Figure 2, we plot the mean value of environmental attitudes by the HDI score for each country. The higher the value on the Y-axis, the higher is the mean value of pro-environmental attitudes in each country. The upper-left figure shows attitudes towards the trade-off between economic growth and the environment. The estimated correlation coefficient is included in the lower right corner of each figure. In countries with low HDI scores (such as India, Philippines and South Africa), people were more likely to think that there is too much environmental concern and not enough worry about economic performance. In contrast, respondents in countries performing well on HDI ranking, such as Sweden, Denmark and Japan, were more likely to agree that preoccupation with the environment is warranted and favoured prioritising the preservation of nature for future generations. The positive country-level correlation between HDI and priority was high (R = 0.81). Apart from a few outliers, such as India, support for paying much higher prices and taxes and accepting a decreased standard of living was higher in countries with higher HDI ranking, but the correlations were moderate (Figure 2). However, given the small sample size, outliers such as India were found to have a large impact on the estimated correlation coefficients (Table A 4). When we excluded India, the country-level correlation between HDI and specific policy instruments increased. For higher prices, it increased from 0.48 to 0.65; for higher taxes, it increased from 0.43 to 0.59; and for accepting cuts in standard of living, it increased from 0.56 to 0.74.

We expected that support for environmental policies would be higher in countries with better quality of government because this is likely to shape the government's capacity to commit to and implement transition policies as well as alternative welfare programmes to mitigate the negative economic and social consequences of transition policies. Figure 3 shows the country mean value of environmental attitudes by the quality of government indicators. In countries with better quality of government, people were more inclined to disagree that raising living standards for people now should have priority over preserving nature for future generations (R = 0.85). The same association was found with respect to specific policy instruments. The strength of the correlations was moderate for higher prices (R = 0.46) and taxes (R = 0.48) and stronger for accepting cuts in standard of living (R = 0.62).

Figure 4 shows the mean value of environmental attitudes by public social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in each country. Respondents in countries that spend a higher share of GDP on social protection were more likely to indicate pro-environmental attitudes with respect to disagreeing that raising living standards for people now should have priority over preserving nature for future generations, with a moderate correlation coefficient (R = 0.59). We expected that social policies would have a positive effect on the acceptance of policy strategies to promote environmental sustainability since this would presumably ease the economic burden of the transition for many households. At the country level, however, we found no indication of higher support for environmental policy instruments in countries with higher social expenditure. Excluding India from the analysis had marginal impacts on the estimated correlation coefficients only (Table A 4).

Experiencing the impacts of climate change and environmental damage firsthand may increase public support transition trajectories towards more environmentally sustainable societies, and we expected the respondents in countries that are more vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change to be more supportive of transition policies. At the country level, we found the opposite or no association (Figure 5). Respondents in more vulnerable countries held less pro-environmental attitudes with respect to the immediate trade-off between economic gains today and the future of the environment (R = -0.53). We found no, or very weak, association between vulnerability and support for prices and taxes, while respondents in countries more vulnerable to climate change were less likely to support cuts in their standard of living (R= - 0.47). Excluding India from the analysis substantially increased this correlation.

Vulnerability score is a measure of a country's exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change. The higher the score on the index, the more vulnerable the country is. Among the most vulnerable countries, we found countries with the lowest values on HDI. Not only are they in regions more exposed to the negative impacts of climate change, but they also lack the financial means to adapt to these impacts (Fankhauser & McDermott, 2014). This is a good example of the 'double injustice' that some countries are subjected to. The countries that were most vulnerable in our analysis, such as India, Philippines and Thailand, were also among the countries with the smallest per capita emissions and least responsibility for the cumulative stock of carbon emissions in the atmosphere.

Figure 2 Environmental attitudes by country-level HDI



Figure 3 Environmental attitudes by quality of government, by country



Figure 4 Environmental attitudes by public social protection expenditure, by country



Figure 5 Environmental attitudes by vulnerability to climate change, by country



4.2 Regression estimates for pooled models

As a first step, we estimated a pooled linear regression model with country fixed effects (Table 2). The estimated parameters referred to the average across the total sample of countries, and all observed and unobserved country-level factors were absorbed in the country variables (see Table A 7 for full output).

Individuals who considered environmental issues to be of particular salience by identifying environmental issues as *the most* or *second most* important issue in the country were likely to agree more to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains. They were also likely to be more willing to pay much higher prices, pay much higher taxes and accept cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment. Similarly, individuals who indicated higher levels of environmental concern also tended to have more pro-environmental attitudes with respect to prioritising the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains and being more supportive of environmental policies. These findings are in line with our expectations and the previous literature (Bergquist et al., 2022).

Both political and interpersonal trust have been identified as predictors of public support for transition policies (Fairbrother, 2016; Harring & Jagers, 2013; Smith & Mayer, 2018). Support for mitigation policies is also likely to depend on interpersonal trust and their perception of whether their fellow citizens will cooperate and adhere to the policies that are implemented. Our estimates showed that individuals who report higher institutional trust are likely to agree more to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains and are more supportive of all three environmental policies. The respondents who believed that most people can be trusted were also more likely to have more pro-environmental attitudes. The coefficients for interpersonal trust were higher, as expected, because the interpersonal trust variable was binary, while the institutional trust variable was measured on an 11-point scale.

Individual income is typically positively correlated with support for transition policies (Bergquist et al., 2022; Fairbrother, 2016). Wealthier individuals who do not need to spend most of their available funds meeting basic needs are more likely to be able to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains and may afford to pay higher prices. Although social position is not the same as income position, it may be a good proxy for financial security. Our findings are in line with our expectations. The respondents with a higher perceived social position were likely to agree more to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains. Higher perceived social position was also associated with higher levels of willingness to accept higher prices and taxes and cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment.

According to the literature, public support for environmental policies tends to be higher among younger segments of the population. In the results from our pooled regression models, age was not a statistically significant determinator for environmental attitudes. An exception was support for taxes. The negative coefficient indicated that the respondents were less likely to be supportive as they got older. In the existing literature, the empirical findings regarding gender differences in pro-environmental attitudes are inconclusive (Bergquist et al., 2022). However, in our pooled model, men were less likely to agree to prioritise the future of the environment over immediate economic gains compared to women. In addition, we found no gender differences in support for higher prices, but men were more likely to be supportive of paying higher taxes and less willing to accept cuts in their standard of living. According to the literature, the more educated people are, the more supportive they tend to be (Bergquist et al., 2022; Fairbrother, 2016). Our findings support this finding. The more educated respondents were more likely to agree to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains; they were also more likely to be supportive of policies needed to support the transition towards more environmentally sustainable societies.

Table 2 Pro-environmental attitudes—Linear regression results

	PRIORITISE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT	HIGHER PRICES	HIGHER TAXES	ACCEPT CUTS IN STD OF LIVING
Environmental salience	0.363*** (0.015)	0.315*** (0.015)	0.401*** (0.016)	0.344*** (0.015)
Environmental concern	0.258*** (0.006)	0.263*** (0.006)	0.235*** (0.006)	0.256*** (0.006)
Institutional trust	0.012*** (0.002)	0.045*** (0.002)	0.063*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.002)
Interpersonal trust	0.125*** (0.013)	0.168*** (0.013)	0.216*** (0.013)	0.153*** (0.013)
Social position	0.009* (0.004)	0.062*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)
Age	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Age squared	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Males	-0.040*** (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	0.025* (0.012)	-0.036** (0.012)
Education (ref: compulsory)				
Secondary	0.023 (0.018)	0.036* (0.018)	0.020 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)
Vocational	0.145*** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.022)	0.069** (0.023)	0.054* (0.023)
Tertiary	0.327*** (0.019)	0.211*** (0.019)	0.215*** (0.020)	0.113*** (0.020)
Country dummies	See Figure 6 or appendix Table A7 for output			
Constant	2.217*** (0.077)	1.199*** (0.077)	1.006*** (0.079)	1.366*** (0.078)
R^2	0.200	0.236	0.215	0.219
N	32 569	32 569	32 569	32 569

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Full model output, including estimated country effects, in Table A 7.

Figure 6 Country coefficients from linear regression results (relative to Australia)



According to the descriptive results presented in section 4.1, there were differences in the level of pro-environmental attitudes across countries. The country-level dummy variables included in the pooled models captured the effects of observed and unobserved factors shared across respondents within countries that were not controlled for by the individual-level variables included in the models (see Table A 7 for full output). When controlling for differences in the explanatory individual-level variables included in the models across countries, the big picture from the descriptive analysis was not altered (Figure 6). The respondents in Sweden, Japan, Denmark, France and Australia were the ones most likely to agree to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains, while the respondents in the Philippines, India, Russia, South Africa and Thailand were the least likely. This is in line with our descriptive statistics.

With respect to support for specific policy instruments, the results are also in line with those obtained from the descriptive analysis. Respondents in India were particularly supportive of all environmental policies, while those in China were more supportive of higher prices and taxes. The respondents in Slovakia and Lithuania were at the other end of that scale.

4.3 Regression estimates from separate models

Our findings on individual characteristics from the pooled models are well-aligned with previous findings in the literature. However, our dataset included a wide variety of countries, and the average estimates across all countries masked country differences. We sorted the 28 countries based on their HDI scores, from low to high. The countries in the lower and higher ends of the HDI scale typically shared other characteristics as well (see Table A 5 for descriptive statistics of country-level variables). Countries with low HDI ranking also had a relatively low value on the quality of government index compared to countries with higher HDI ranking; the share of GDP spent on social protection was also low. These characteristics are country-level factors that, according to previous studies, reduce public support for transition policies.

The tables with country-level regression results are included in in Table A 8–Table A 27. An overall finding from the separate models is that we explain less of the variance in pro-environmental attitudes in countries with low HDI ranking. While 23–39% of the variance in support for higher prices can be explained by the models estimated for the six countries with the highest HDI (Table A 17), the same models explain 5–16% of the variance for the countries with the lowest HDI (Table A 13). This indicates that the explanatory factors identified in previous studies do not necessarily explain variation in attitudes among people living in countries with low HDI, typically situated in the Global South. These findings are illustrated in the Appendix (Figure A 5–Figure A 8).

In the pooled model, environmental salience was positively associated with pro-environmental attitudes. When we ran separate models for each country, we found that our measure of perceived environmental salience was not a determinant of willingness to prioritise the future of the environment but rather immediate economic gains in the countries with lower HDI ranking (Table A 8). With respect to support for specific environmental policy instruments, environmental salience was found to be statistically insignificant in some of the countries with low HDI. Respondents in countries with low HDI scores have had other pressing issues in mind, such as poverty and education, and were less likely to identify the environment as a topmost important issue in the country (Table A 6). And those that did identify the environment as a topmost important issue, were not necessarily more supportive of the suggested policies to support a sustainability transition. With a few exceptions, such as Italy and Japan, perceived environmental salience was a significant predictor of pro-environmental attitudes among respondents in countries with higher HDI. Respondents who identified environmental issues as important were more likely to prioritise

the future of the environment over immediate economic gains and were more supportive of environmental policies.

Numerous studies have found that concern about environmental issues is positively associated with willingness to accept mitigation policies (Bergquist et al., 2022), and our results from the pooled models are in line with this. With a few exceptions, we found the same for the separate models. In the Philippines, people who were more concerned about environmental issues were not significantly more supportive of environmental policies and were not more likely to prioritise the future of the environment over immediate economic gains. In Hungary, there was no significant association between the level of concern and support for any of the policy instruments. Beyond these countries, the estimates indicated that people who were more concerned were also more likely to prioritise the future of the environment and support policies to protect the environment.

Both political and interpersonal trust have been identified as predictors of public support for transition policies (Fairbrother, 2016; Harring & Jagers, 2013; Smith & Mayer, 2018). The results from the pooled models are in line with this, while the findings from the separate models are mixed. In many countries, higher institutional trust was associated with more pro-environmental attitudes, but there were many exceptions. The respondents who indicated higher institutional trust in South Africa, Philippines, Thailand, Russia, South Korea and Hungary were less likely to prioritise the future of the environment over immediate economic gains. In contrast, the level of institutional trust was not a significant predictor of this variable in India, Italy, US, Austria, Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, Iceland and Switzerland. Similarly, interpersonal trust was not a significant predictor in most of these countries. Regarding support for specific policies, the respondents' level of institutional trust was not a significant predictor for support for taxes or higher prices in Thailand, South Korea, Australia and Iceland, and not for support for reduced standard of living in Russia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, South Korea, Austria, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Iceland and Switzerland. Individuals who reported higher institutional trust in India were less supportive of all three environmental policies.

With respect to perceived social position, the findings from the pooled models were in line with our expectations. Respondents with a higher perceived social position were likely to agree more to prioritise the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains. A higher perceived social position was also associated with higher support for policy instruments to protect the environment. Again, in the separate models, the results were mixed. With respect to whether they were in favour of prioritising the future of the environment over immediate economic gains, the results were inconclusive. In most countries, the association was not statistically significant, while in India, Thailand and Denmark, there was a statistically negative association. In Germany and Switzerland, respondents with a higher perceived social position were more likely to be in favour of prioritising the future of the environment rather than immediate economic gains. In most countries, higher perceived social position was either statistically insignificant or positively associated with higher support for environmental policies. An exception was India, where respondents with a higher perceived social position were less likely to be supportive of all policy instruments.

In the models, we also included age, gender, education and whether the respondent lived in an urban or rural setting (this variable was not included in the model for China). With a few exceptions, neither age nor gender was a statistically significant predictor of the respondents' environmental attitudes. The results from the pooled models indicated that pro-environmental attitudes increase with higher education. When statistically significant, this was the general finding across the separate models as well.

5. Conclusions

Across the world, societies must transition to more environmentally sustainable public policies and economic practices. In this study, we investigated the factors that explain the differences in public support for and opposition to policy strategies aimed at this goal among people living in different institutional and socio-economic contexts. Our findings showed that there were large differences in how people across different countries view the trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation. The population in countries with stronger performances in health, education and standard of living were more likely to disagree that raising living standards for people now should have priority over preserving nature for future generations. While nearly half of the respondents in South Africa, Thailand, Slovakia and the Philippines agreed that we worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today, the share was 10% in Japan and 16% in Sweden. A possible explanation for this is that there is a shift in peoples' priorities when they no longer need to spend much of their time and financial resources meeting basic needs. Peoples' values may change from materialistic to post-materialistic as income increases (Inglehart, 1997). Similarly, a healthy environment is not necessarily only a public good but one for which demand rises with income (Diekmann & Franzen, 1999). Thus, in countries with higher HDI scores, people are more likely to favour investments in environmental protection. Conversely, weak quality of government and low social expenditure were factors associated with support for reduced attention to the future of the environment and more to the jobs and prices today.

Overall, people who considered the environment a particularly salient issue in their country and those who were concerned about environmental issues were more willing to prioritise the future of the environment over immediate economic gains. However, while exploring country differentials, we found heterogeneity in the relationship between attitudes and individual characteristics. The perceived salience of the environment as an issue for the respondent's country did not matter for the willingness to support the future of the environment over economic gains in the countries with lower HDI ranking. Respondents in countries with low HDI scores faced other pressing issues, such as poverty and education. They were less likely to identify the environment as one of the most important issues in the country, and those who did were not necessarily preoccupied with the future of the environment. In terms of institutional trust, the results from the pooled models were in line with the existing literature, which shows a positive association with the willingness to make sacrifices to the benefit of future generations (Fairbrother et al., 2021). However, the findings from the separate-country models were mixed. On the one hand, respondents who expressed high institutional trust in South Africa, Philippines, Thailand, Russia, South Korea and Hungary were less preoccupied with preserving the environment for future generations and believed that more attention should be paid to economic parameters such as jobs and prices. On the other hand, in many other countries, the level of institutional trust was not a significant predictor of opinions on this trade-off.

Support for higher taxes was lower than that for higher prices and cuts in standard of living. This was as expected based on the existing academic literature and was common across almost all countries included in the analysis. People in countries with higher HDI scores and better quality of government were more positive towards environmental policy. Moreover, we found that a high degree of vulnerability to the damaging impacts of climate change did not necessarily align with support for mitigation policies. Although this was not in line with our expectations, it was not surprising, given other characteristics of these countries. The most vulnerable countries were typically the ones at the lower end of both HDI and the quality of government index. This index comprises three components: 'Corruption', 'Law and Order' and 'Bureaucracy Quality' (Teorell et al.,

2024). These factors are likely to affect the government's ability to commit to and implement transition policies as well as alternative welfare programmes to mitigate the negative social impacts of the transition. This, in turn, may shape the lack of public support for environmental policies in some of these countries.

While the rich Global North countries, which perform well in terms of HDI, are responsible for a disproportionate share of the historical carbon emissions in the atmosphere, countries in the Global South are more affected by the negative consequences. Climate change mitigation policies play a central role in the sustainability transition, and understanding the distributional impacts of the policies is crucial to facilitate a just transition. Instruments such as taxes and reduced subsidies of environmentally harmful goods and services are often associated with positive impacts on outcomes related to the environment, technology and innovation, but they are also associated with negative distributional outcomes (Peñasco et al., 2021). Social policies potentially reduce the adverse effects of climate change and make the costs of transition policies less of a burden for vulnerable households. Nonetheless, in our analysis, we found no indication of higher support for the policy instruments among respondents in countries with higher public social expenditure. However, public social expenditure arguably has weaknesses as a proxy for the redistributive and socially mitigating role of social policy in reducing the socio-economic burdens embedded in different transition pathways. In many of the countries that spend a high share of their GDP on public social expenditure, this is driven by high costs of old-age pension systems, which were primarily designed to protect against poverty in old age rather than the economic risks associated with transition policies. Intuition suggests that the support for pro-environmental strategies should be affected more strongly by the provision of unemployment benefits or access to health and education services than old age pensions, which redistributes first and foremost horizontally, across the lifecycle. However, future research should explore this relationship more in detail.

Estimates from the pooled models indicated a positive association between perceived social position and citizens' willingness to bear some of the costs that sustainability transitions entail. This was evident in terms of supporting both the preservation of nature for future generations rather than prioritising present living standards and the policy instruments to facilitate the sustainability transition. In the separate models, the results were inconclusive regarding the potential tension between preferences for more attention towards the current economic situation, on the hand, and the future of the environment, on the other. However, support for higher prices and taxes was generally higher among respondents with a higher social position in most countries, including in those on the lower end of the HDI. Respondents who placed themselves at the bottom end of the social ladder were less supportive of higher prices and taxes. In addition to being low emitters, households with less income may also be disproportionally affected by the consequences of higher taxes and prices, unless the instruments are designed to counteract the regressive distributional effects of mitigation policies. This is likely to influence their support for transition policies, but we still need a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which social policy may go hand in hand with climate mitigation with a view to achieving a fair transition.

An underlying assumption of our study has been that public attitudes shape the context in which politicians make policy decisions in a potentially constraining or enabling direction. Knowledge about what factors explain public support for and opposition to sustainability trajectories among people living in different institutional and socio-economic contexts is important against the backdrop of international geopolitical tensions and conflict, high levels of social inequality across and within global regions, and increasing political polarisation in many countries. Considering these circumstances, it is essential with a detailed understanding of the factors that shape public attitudes towards different strategies to foster environmental sustainability. The main contribution of this research has been to obtain insights about such attitudes (albeit imperfectly so) from

countries beyond Europe, even if outside, the country coverage of the ISSP data was highly uneven. The dataset included no countries from South America and only one from Africa.

Nonetheless, a key message is that our expected explanatory variables did not do a particularly good job at explaining the characteristics of individual support for different environmental priorities and policy instruments in the Global South countries in our sample. Explanatory factors identified in previous studies using data from the Global North only very partially explained variation in individual attitudes in the country cases with low Human Development Index scores. This calls for more research on the factors that explain differences in environmental attitudes and support for transition policies in the Global South. Further research efforts should focus on collecting high-quality data in the Global South and develop analytical models and hypotheses that are more sensitive to the political structures, cultural and social norms and economic structures of these countries.

From this recommendation for research, we derive also an important message for policymakers, who frequently look to other countries to learn from their experiences. Policy learning and the search for best practices are frequently facilitated and promoted by international organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD to mention only two examples. There is undoubtedly much to learn from the experiences of other countries. Yet, a lesson from our study is that we must caution against the anticipation of public reactions for or against specific policy goals or instruments only based on the public attitudes observed in countries where the policies in question have been tried. Particularly is this the case when it comes to the transfer of policies from the Global North to the Global South. A policy instrument that proves popular and face little opposition in Europe might be perceived as highly problematic in Africa or Asia and vice versa.

Appendix

Table A 1 Description of individual level variables, including phrasing in questionnaire of question when relevant

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION
Environment vs economy	'We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today'. 5 point likert scale, from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)
Higher prices	'How willing would you be to pay much higher prices in order to protect the environment? ' 5 point likert scale, from very unwilling (1) to very willing (5). Reversed responses
Higher taxes	'How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?' 5 point likert scale, from very unwilling (1) to very willing (5). Reversed responses
Reduce standard of living	'How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect the environment?' 5 point likert scale, from very unwilling (1) to very willing (5). Reversed responses
Environmental salience	'Which of these issues is the most important for [COUNTRY] today/ Which is the next most important?' 1 if they identify the environment as the most, or next most, important issue in their country today, 0 otherwise
Environmental concern	'Generally speaking, how concerned are you about environmental issues?' 5 point likert scale, from not at all concerned (1) to very concerned (5)
Institutional trust	'On a scale of 0 to 10, how much do you personally trust the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT]?' from 0 – no trust at all, 10 – complete trust
Intrapersonal trust	'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Dichotomized variable, value 1 if the respondent indicate that most people can be trusted, 0 otherwise (mid-value is included in trust=1)
Top-bottom	'In our society, there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from the top to the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale?' 1-bottom, 10-top
Gender	1 if male, 0 if female
Age	Age in years
Education	1-Primary education or less, 2-Secondary (Upper secondary), 3-Vocational, 4-Tertiary. Country specific in ISSP, but categorized into 4 categories based on variable called EDULEVEL in ISSP
Urban-rural	Characteristics of place of living. 1-Big city, 2-suburbs/outskirts of big city, 3-town or small city, 4-country village/farm/home in the country

For further details on ISSP data, see the variable report related to the ISSP 2020 Environment IV data set (GESIS, 2023)

Table A 2 Comparison mean values across analytical sample and full sample

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD. DEV.	MIN	MAX
Analytical sample					
Priority	32,569	3.18	1.18	1	5
Higher prices	32,569	2.92	1.20	1	5
Higher taxes	32,569	2.60	1.21	1	5
Std of living	32,569	2.96	1.20	1	5
Salience	32,569	0.23	0.42	0	1
Concern	32,569	3.85	1.06	1	5
Institutional trust	32,569	4.85	2.87	0	10
Intrapersonal trust	32,569	0.65	0.48	0	1
Top-bottom	32,569	5.53	1.82	1	10
Age	32,569	48.08	15.15	20	75
Share males	32,569	0.48	0.50	0	1
Education	32,569	2.55	1.14	1	4
Urban-rural	30,509	2.69	1.16	1	4
Full ISSP sample					
Priority	42,427	3.17	1.17	1	5
Higher prices	42,742	2.92	1.19	1	5
Higher taxes	42,503	2.58	1.21	1	5
Std of living	42,781	2.95	1.20	1	5
Salience	42,964	0.23	0.42	0	1
Concern	43,433	3.85	1.07	1	5
Institutional trust	42,689	4.88	2.89	0	10
Intrapersonal trust	43,399	0.64	0.48	0	1
Top-bottom	41,430	5.48	1.85	1	10
Age	43,694	50.13	17.43	15	103
Share males	44,027	0.47	0.50	0	1
Education	43,267	2.46	1.14	1	4
Urban-rural	40,621	2.71	1.15	1	4

Table A 3 Mean value of dependent variables, by country

Country	Prioritise future environment	Higher prices	Higher taxes	Reduced standard of living	N
South Africa	2.69	2.77	2.61	2.68	2,345
India	2.83	3.80	3.59	3.71	1,081
Philippines	2.71	2.44	2.24	2.68	1,242
China	2.91	3.24	3.03	2.77	1,975
Thailand	2.73	2.51	2.40	2.52	1,035
Russia	2.83	2.27	1.86	2.65	1,315
Slovakia	2.72	1.98	1.91	2.12	862
Hungary	3.10	2.44	2.09	2.25	855
Croatia	2.90	2.36	2.12	2.34	878
Lithuania	2.96	2.33	2.23	2.27	904
Italy	3.17	2.62	2.15	2.60	847
France	3.68	3.15	2.52	3.00	928
Spain	3.00	2.50	2.39	2.70	1,431
Slovenia	3.20	2.96	2.56	3.16	785
United States	3.44	3.10	2.81	2.90	1,396
Austria	3.45	2.80	2.60	3.31	996
S. Korea	3.19	3.27	3.07	3.00	1,073
Japan	3.70	3.23	2.65	2.77	1,003
Taiwan	3.05	3.02	2.72	3.43	1,449
Germany	3.46	3.10	2.53	3.39	1,218
New Zealand	3.47	2.94	2.74	2.91	674
Finland	3.25	2.87	2.59	3.08	903
Australia	3.63	3.16	2.83	2.97	733
Sweden	3.79	3.06	2.77	3.20	1,310
Denmark	3.74	3.18	2.88	3.10	683
Iceland	3.54	3.13	2.68	2.99	665
Switzerland	3.38	3.39	2.70	3.68	3,117
Norway	3.57	3.22	2.90	3.17	866
Total	**3.18**	**2.92**	**2.6**	**2.96**	**32,569**

Figure A 1 Responses to 'We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today'



Figure A 2 Willingness to pay much higher prices in order to protect the environment



Figure A 3 Willingness to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment

Figure A 4 Willingness to accept cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment



Table A 4 Correlation coefficients, with and without India

SPEARMAN'S RHO			
		Total sample	Excl India
HDI	Prioritise future environment	0.8106	-
	Higher prices	0.4767	0.6471
	Higher taxes	0.4291	0.5940
	Cuts in std of living	0.5632	0.7436
Quality of government	Prioritise future environment	0.8484	-
	Higher prices	0.4614	0.5183
	Higher taxes	0.4800	0.5421
	Cuts in std of living	0.6201	0.6856
Social protection expenditure	Prioritise future environment	0.5703	-
	Higher prices	-0.0372	0.0604
	Higher taxes	-0.1631	-0.0794
	Cuts in std of living	0.3381	0.3126
Climate vulnerability	Prioritise future environment	-0.5275	-
	Higher prices	-0.1618	-0.3012
	Higher taxes	-0.0806	-0.2103
	Cuts in std of living	-0.4707	-0.6472

Table A 5 Descriptive statistics of individual and country level characteristics, by country

Country	Salience (share)	Concern (mean)	Institutional trust (mean)	Trust people (share)	Social position (mean)	Age (mean)	Gender (share men)	Education (mean)	Urban – rural (mean)	HDI value	Vulnerability index value	Quality of gov't index value	Social protection (% of GDP)
IN-India	0.17	4.0	6.0	0.55	6.0	40.5	0.54	1.8	3.4	0.63	0.46	0.64	4.0
PH-Philippines	0.04	4.1	5.6	0.37	5.4	43.8	0.49	2.0	2.7	0.70	0.45	0.53	2.7
ZA-South Africa	0.08	3.6	4.4	0.54	5.0	43.0	0.41	1.9	2.7	0.71	0.38	0.46	5.4
CN-China	0.12	3.6	8.8	0.68	4.3	48.4	0.46	1.9	missing	0.77	0.35	0.44	7.9
TH-Thailand	0.06	3.3	4.1	0.65	4.9	43.6	0.46	2.1	3.5	0.80	0.41	0.42	4.9
RU-Russia	0.07	4.0	3.4	0.45	4.5	44.8	0.45	3.1	2.2	0.82	0.33	0.42	13.4
SK-Slovakia	0.10	3.2	2.7	0.37	5.1	47.4	0.53	2.6	3.2	0.85	0.34	0.63	14.3
HU-Hungary	0.10	3.7	4.7	0.56	5.0	49.0	0.40	1.9	2.5	0.85	0.35	0.62	13.5
HR-Croatia	0.07	3.7	2.6	0.59	6.0	42.0	0.45	2.4	2.7	0.86	0.38	0.67	14.7
LT-Lithuania	0.11	3.8	3.1	0.62	5.6	49.7	0.47	2.8	2.5	0.88	0.36	0.60	12.1
IT-Italy	0.18	4.1	4.1	0.53	5.5	50.8	0.51	2.2	2.8	0.90	0.34	0.60	20.9
FR-France	0.26	4.0	4.6	0.59	5.2	54.2	0.48	2.8	2.9	0.90	0.30	0.79	23.9
ES-Spain	0.12	4.3	3.2	0.68	5.4	48.0	0.50	2.6	2.8	0.91	0.29	0.72	16.8
SI-Slovenia	0.09	4.3	3.1	0.58	5.6	46.4	0.50	2.8	3.1	0.92	0.31	0.72	16.7
US-United States	0.25	3.9	3.3	0.65	6.4	50.0	0.46	3.0	2.0	0.92	0.30	0.78	18.9
AT-Austria	0.22	3.8	4.9	0.79	5.4	52.3	0.49	2.5	2.8	0.92	0.29	0.92	20.1
KR-Korea (South)	0.41	3.7	3.6	0.72	5.3	50.3	0.43	2.4	2.0	0.93	0.35	0.75	6.3
JP-Japan	0.23	4.1	3.7	0.56	4.9	52.2	0.50	2.8	2.8	0.93	0.36	0.83	16.1

TW-Taiwan	0.33	3.9	3.9	0.59	4.9	46.8	0.45	2.7	2.3	0.93	missing	0.72	11.0
DE-Germany	0.44	3.9	5.1	0.69	6.0	50.0	0.48	3.0	2.8	0.94	0.30	0.89	19.4
NZ-New Zealand	0.32	4.2	5.7	0.76	6.4	46.5	0.46	2.9	2.2	0.94	0.32	0.94	11.5
FI-Finland	0.26	3.7	5.8	0.78	6.1	50.6	0.47	3.1	2.7	0.94	0.29	0.97	24.4
AU-Australia	0.43	4.1	4.7	0.72	6.1	54.5	0.48	2.9	2.4	0.95	0.30	0.89	9.4
SE-Sweden	0.29	3.7	6.0	0.80	6.1	52.8	0.50	2.7	2.6	0.95	0.32	0.94	19.5
DK-Denmark	0.39	3.8	6.0	0.87	6.4	49.9	0.53	3.1	2.5	0.95	0.34	1.00	22.2
IS-Iceland	0.26	3.8	5.3	0.89	6.4	48.7	0.50	2.9	2.0	0.96	0.35	0.92	9.9
CH-Switzerland	0.48	4.0	6.2	0.75	6.3	48.1	0.52	2.7	3.1	0.96	0.25	0.89	12.8
NO-Norway	0.43	3.7	6.8	0.91	6.4	51.5	0.49	3.2	2.6	0.96	0.27	0.94	19.1
TOTAL	**0.23**	**3.9**	**4.9**	**0.65**	**5.5**	**48.1**	**0.48**	**2.6**	**2.7**	**0.87**	**0.33**	**0.72**	**13.3**

Table A 6 Most, or second most, important issue for the country today? In percentages, by country

	Health care	Education	Crime	Environment	Immigration	Economy	Terrorism	Poverty	None of the above
IN-India	23.77	43.66	19.80	16.84	9.71	33.58	11.93	38.21	1.39
PH-Philippines	68.12	66.43	4.99	4.19	0.48	24.24	0.72	29.55	0.56
ZA-South Africa	43.22	41.47	38.40	8.49	5.67	21.93	1.02	31.44	0.90
CN-China	66.21	70.20	5.08	11.85	0.30	25.18	2.34	16.05	1.42
TH-Thailand	53.91	17.58	2.61	6.28	0.39	72.27	1.55	43.77	1.55
RU-Russia	59.27	24.87	10.21	6.84	7.48	38.03	4.96	45.12	1.30
SK-Slovakia	55.92	15.43	9.28	9.98	18.68	42.34	2.20	43.85	1.04
HU-Hungary	75.67	22.11	12.98	10.29	16.02	21.29	3.16	37.31	0.82
HR-Croatia	52.16	26.54	20.50	7.18	7.06	54.10	0.91	30.98	0.34
LT-Lithuania	54.98	19.36	9.51	11.28	18.92	46.13	1.00	35.18	1.44
IT-Italy	42.38	17.47	23.97	18.06	15.23	47.58	2.36	32.35	0.24
FR-France	63.15	28.77	10.67	25.86	8.30	34.48	8.30	12.18	0.65
ES-Spain	56.97	32.45	10.50	11.67	8.76	56.36	0.14	17.73	2.80
SI-Slovenia	72.34	10.65	8.18	8.66	12.21	46.88	1.43	27.92	7.26
US-United States	58.55	32.40	10.88	24.86	8.70	39.58	5.64	15.09	5.66
AT-Austria	65.06	18.57	12.15	21.99	15.46	46.39	4.02	14.66	1.00
KR-Korea (South)	23.39	13.70	30.10	40.82	2.89	72.97	1.30	12.40	1.21
JP-Japan	45.46	25.92	8.67	23.13	2.39	66.10	1.69	16.85	7.68
TW-Taiwan	42.40	50.00	15.61	32.85	1.24	47.55	1.59	5.73	1.38

DE-Germany	57.07	33.64	5.22	43.51	14.74	27.81	2.16	12.76	1.82
NZ-New Zealand	51.71	28.23	9.21	32.34	6.69	38.63	0.59	28.34	2.38
FI-Finland	65.59	22.31	3.44	25.69	9.33	60.56	0.44	9.33	2.00
AU-Australia	49.31	31.82	13.62	42.97	7.31	37.29	2.21	12.02	1.80
SE-Sweden	47.62	33.05	44.37	28.63	29.01	8.13	0.69	6.68	0.54
DK-Denmark	49.05	27.67	7.32	39.39	16.11	47.73	2.05	7.32	1.76
IS-Iceland	78.88	25.30	1.21	26.47	4.98	38.40	0.15	17.19	1.21
CH-Switzerland	58.02	28.23	4.18	48.19	22.01	21.44	1.39	12.34	2.98
NO-Norway	61.32	27.18	10.58	43.42	10.23	31.75	1.28	11.28	1.86
Total	**54.57**	**32.45**	**13.65**	**23.01**	**10.18**	**38.27**	**2.34**	**21.59**	**1.97**

Table A 7 Pro-environmental attitudes. Linear regression results, with country fixed effects. Full output

	PRIORITISE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT	HIGHER PRICES	HIGHER TAXES	ACCEPT CUTS IN STD OF LIVING
Environmental salience	0.363***	0.315***	0.401***	0.344***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Environmental concern	0.258***	0.263***	0.235***	0.256***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Institutional trust	0.012***	0.045***	0.063***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Interpersonal trust	0.125***	0.168***	0.216***	0.153***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Social position	0.009*	0.062***	0.047***	0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.000	-0.003	-0.006*	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Males	-0.040***	0.009	0.025*	-0.036**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education (ref: compulsory)				
Secondary	0.023	0.036*	0.020	0.022
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Vocational	0.145***	0.109***	0.069**	0.054*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Tertiary	0.327***	0.211***	0.215***	0.113***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Country (ref: Australia)				
Austria	0.040	-0.149**	-0.021	0.498***
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.052)
China	-0.437***	0.302***	0.338***	-0.024
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Taiwan	-0.476***	0.080	0.118*	0.595***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Croatia	-0.443***	-0.425***	-0.284***	-0.339***
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Denmark	0.129*	-0.008	-0.007	0.137*
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Finland	-0.270***	-0.213***	-0.173**	0.198***
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)
France	0.189***	0.168**	-0.118*	0.154**
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Germany	-0.155**	-0.031	-0.284***	0.437***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Hungary	-0.202***	-0.351***	-0.353***	-0.442***
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)

Iceland	-0.028 (0.057)	0.009 (0.056)	-0.124* (0.058)	0.068 (0.057)
India	-0.637*** (0.052)	0.786*** (0.052)	0.894*** (0.053)	0.836*** (0.052)
Italy	-0.266*** (0.054)	-0.323*** (0.053)	-0.428*** (0.055)	-0.209*** (0.054)
Japan	0.218*** (0.052)	0.303*** (0.051)	0.082 (0.053)	-0.045 (0.052)
South Korea	-0.281*** (0.051)	0.343*** (0.050)	0.477*** (0.052)	0.180*** (0.051)
Lithuania	-0.444*** (0.053)	-0.527*** (0.052)	-0.247*** (0.054)	-0.448*** (0.053)
New Zealand	-0.193*** (0.056)	-0.285*** (0.056)	-0.163** (0.058)	-0.106 (0.057)
Norway	-0.051 (0.053)	-0.007 (0.053)	-0.050 (0.054)	0.184*** (0.054)
Philippines	-0.716*** (0.051)	-0.490*** (0.050)	-0.339*** (0.052)	-0.113* (0.051)
Russia	-0.628*** (0.050)	-0.555*** (0.049)	-0.592*** (0.051)	-0.090 (0.050)
Slovakia	-0.480*** (0.054)	-0.617*** (0.054)	-0.320*** (0.055)	-0.390*** (0.054)
Slovenia	-0.312*** (0.055)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.009 (0.056)	0.331*** (0.055)
South Africa	-0.567*** (0.046)	0.044 (0.045)	0.221*** (0.047)	0.028 (0.046)
Spain	-0.541*** (0.048)	-0.473*** (0.048)	-0.206*** (0.049)	-0.151** (0.049)
Sweden	0.316*** (0.049)	0.002 (0.049)	0.019 (0.050)	0.339*** (0.049)
Switzerland	-0.278*** (0.044)	0.164*** (0.043)	-0.235*** (0.045)	0.641*** (0.044)
Thailand	-0.513*** (0.052)	-0.166** (0.051)	0.055 (0.053)	-0.069 (0.052)
United States	-0.076 (0.048)	0.098* (0.048)	0.184*** (0.049)	0.071 (0.049)
Constant	2.217*** (0.077)	1.199*** (0.077)	1.006*** (0.079)	1.366*** (0.078)
R^2	**0.200**	**0.236**	**0.215**	**0.219**
N	**32 569**	**32 569**	**32 569**	**32 569**

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A 8 Probability of increased disagreement to the following statement: "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today".

	S. AFRICA	INDIA	PHILIPPINES	CHINA	THAILAND
Env. salience	-0.054	-0.048	0.183	0.085	-0.109
	(0.076)	(0.100)	(0.148)	(0.075)	(0.124)
Env. concern	0.036*	0.209***	0.018	-0.009	0.051*
	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Institutional trust	-0.035***	0.001	-0.034**	0.035*	-0.030*
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Trust in people	-0.051	0.193*	-0.021	0.067	-0.061
	(0.044)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.066)
Social position	0.020	-0.051**	-0.013	0.020	-0.050*
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Age	-0.001	-0.016	-0.004	-0.018	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.069	0.083	-0.054	0.035	-0.023
	(0.043)	(0.075)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.060)
Education: secondary	0.016	0.040	-0.241	-0.007	0.010
	(0.053)	(0.109)	(0.254)	(0.075)	(0.088)
Education: vocational	0.218*	0.247	-0.122	0.149*	-0.153
	(0.092)	(0.709)	(0.116)	(0.074)	(0.116)
Education: tertiary	0.122	-0.080	-0.080	0.232**	0.088
	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.096)
Living: big city	0.083	0.215	0.056		0.686***
	(0.066)	(0.121)	(0.069)		(0.112)
Living: suburbs	0.105	-0.339	-0.178		-0.216
	(0.058)	(0.192)	(0.117)		(0.147)
Living: small town	-0.009	-0.063	-0.016		0.217
	(0.054)	(0.103)	(0.088)		(0.203)
Constant	2.488***	2.485***	3.021***	2.921***	2.621***
	(0.212)	(0.442)	(0.335)	(0.298)	(0.329)
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.06
N	2,345	1,081	1,238	1,975	1,035

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 9 Probability of increased disagreement to the following statement: "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today".

	RUSSIA	SLOVAKIA	HUNGARY	CROATIA	LITHUANIA
Env. salience	0.028	0.297*	0.098	0.162	0.312**
	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.150)	(0.102)
Env. concern	0.099**	0.307***	0.114**	0.221***	0.206***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Institutional trust	-0.033**	0.042**	-0.051***	0.040*	0.073***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.146*	0.109	-0.022	0.012	0.138*
	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.068)
Social position	-0.003	0.041	0.003	0.040	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Age	-0.016	0.016	-0.003	-0.006	-0.044**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Age squared	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.138	-0.081	-0.153*	-0.033	-0.043
	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.065)
Education: secondary	-0.005	-0.083	0.049	0.087	0.018
	(0.200)	(0.147)	(0.091)	(0.175)	(0.117)
Education: vocational	0.038	0.043	0.022	0.058	0.245
	(0.186)	(0.308)	(0.151)	(0.256)	(0.128)
Education: tertiary	0.200	0.162	0.128	0.347	0.403**
	(0.194)	(0.156)	(0.126)	(0.194)	(0.124)
Living: big city	0.078	-0.056	-0.077	0.451***	0.049
	(0.095)	(0.127)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.080)
Living: suburbs	-0.042	0.020	-0.256	0.462***	-0.030
	(0.215)	(0.174)	(0.257)	(0.133)	(0.159)
Living: small town	-0.143	-0.077	0.013	0.165	0.151
	(0.101)	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.084)
Constant	3.153***	1.126**	3.239***	1.494***	2.726***
	(0.417)	(0.425)	(0.460)	(0.410)	(0.402)
R^2	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.09	0.21
N	1,315	862	855	877	904

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 10 Probability of increased disagreement to the following statement: "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today".

	ITALY	FRANCE	SPAIN	SLOVENIA	US	AUSTRIA
Env. salience	0.113	0.260***	0.312***	0.424**	0.635***	0.243**
	(0.098)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.138)	(0.064)	(0.079)
Env. concern	0.192***	0.444***	0.475***	0.230***	0.456***	0.375***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Institutional trust	0.028	0.038**	0.049***	0.032*	0.006	0.013
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.054	0.100	0.134*	0.224**	0.106*	0.006
	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.054)	(0.083)
Social position	-0.006	0.020	0.020	-0.016	-0.011	0.006
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Age	0.002	0.006	-0.002	-0.005	-0.003	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.076	0.013	-0.045	-0.003	-0.019	-0.121
	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.051)	(0.065)
Education: secondary	0.163	0.212	0.314***	0.319	0.142	0.173
	(0.099)	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.174)	(0.111)	(0.123)
Education: vocational	0.077	0.440***	0.282**	0.647**	0.086	0.155
	(0.388)	(0.126)	(0.100)	(0.202)	(0.129)	(0.139)
Education: tertiary	0.437***	0.565***	0.664***	0.820***	0.308**	0.294*
	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.078)	(0.185)	(0.111)	(0.144)
Living: big city	0.278**	-0.112	0.107	0.002	0.093	-0.162
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.089)	(0.084)
Living: suburbs	0.148	0.127	-0.025	0.035	0.047	-0.380*
	(0.150)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.151)	(0.082)	(0.189)
Living: small town	0.067	0.040	-0.006	0.155	0.020	-0.011
	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.166)	(0.077)
Constant	1.898***	1.344**	0.380	1.780***	1.454***	1.692***
	(0.426)	(0.491)	(0.344)	(0.441)	(0.335)	(0.433)
R^2	0.09	0.27	0.24	0.14	0.38	0.15
N	847	928	1,423	784	1,396	996

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 11 Probability of increased disagreement to the following statement: "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today".

	SOUTH KOREA	JAPAN	TAIWAN	GERMANY	NEW Z.	FINLAND
Env. salience	0.004	0.000	0.105	0.302***	0.477***	0.390***
	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.091)	(0.082)
Env. concern	0.144***	0.327***	0.074*	0.437***	0.352***	0.380***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Institutional trust	-0.043**	-0.012	0.006	0.027*	0.056**	0.090***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Trust in people	-0.145*	0.068	0.083	0.180**	0.005	0.215*
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.098)	(0.085)
Social position	-0.042*	0.003	0.029	0.052**	0.021	0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Age	-0.001	0.032*	0.016	0.013	0.004	-0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.107	0.083	0.053	0.030	-0.101	0.021
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.081)	(0.067)
Education: secondary	0.079	0.243	-0.162	0.462**	0.162	-0.141
	(0.088)	(0.134)	(0.087)	(0.158)	(0.146)	(0.155)
Education: vocational	0.265*	0.351*	0.031	0.467**	0.360**	0.099
	(0.120)	(0.148)	(0.109)	(0.170)	(0.131)	(0.153)
Education: tertiary	0.157	0.519***	0.203*	0.569***	0.461***	0.316*
	(0.107)	(0.144)	(0.095)	(0.160)	(0.132)	(0.157)
Living: big city	0.006	-0.100	0.000	0.049	-0.072	0.262*
	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.142)	(0.119)
Living: suburbs	0.004	-0.095	0.008	0.056	0.079	0.110
	(0.114)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.135)	(0.086)
Living: small town	-0.024	0.114	0.015	0.038	0.051	0.143
	(0.117)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.071)	(0.144)	(0.089)
Constant	3.154***	1.269**	2.121***	0.567	1.190**	1.447***
	(0.359)	(0.390)	(0.334)	(0.349)	(0.448)	(0.405)
R^2	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.29	0.24	0.35
N	1,070	998	1,446	1,217	671	901

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 12 Probability of increased disagreement to the following statement: "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today".

	AUSTRALIA	SWEDEN	DENMARK	ICELAND	SWITZERLAND	NORWAY
Env. salience	0.693***	0.390***	0.422***	0.281**	0.410***	0.334***
	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.096)	(0.088)	(0.037)	(0.068)
Env. concern	0.408***	0.382***	0.411***	0.439***	0.415***	0.406***
	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Institutional trust	-0.014	0.042***	0.035	0.011	0.009	0.033*
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.100	0.173**	0.243	0.250*	0.283***	0.323**
	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.128)	(0.119)	(0.042)	(0.114)
Social position	0.018	-0.001	-0.072*	-0.017	0.052***	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.020)
Age	-0.010	-0.018	0.018	-0.032	-0.012	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.060	-0.010	-0.041	-0.199**	-0.011	-0.044
	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.083)	(0.073)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Education: secondary	0.306*	0.371***	0.147	0.255	0.187**	0.157
	(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.201)	(0.134)	(0.060)	(0.145)
Education: vocational	0.434***	0.615***	0.268	0.437**	0.409***	0.238
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.227)	(0.154)	(0.072)	(0.153)
Education: tertiary	0.535***	0.657***	0.466*	0.644***	0.518***	0.510***
	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.205)	(0.137)	(0.065)	(0.144)
Living: big city	0.159	-0.086	0.135	-0.170	0.058	-0.013
	(0.130)	(0.069)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.059)	(0.080)
Living: suburbs	0.039	-0.095	0.190	-0.206	0.054	0.023
	(0.104)	(0.072)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.053)	(0.102)
Living: small town	0.133	-0.125	0.027	-0.278*	-0.041	-0.036
	(0.111)	(0.068)	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.042)	(0.083)
Constant	1.557**	2.057***	1.531**	2.371***	1.057***	1.343***
	(0.483)	(0.304)	(0.518)	(0.456)	(0.204)	(0.387)
R^2	0.43	0.35	0.29	0.34	0.30	0.37
N	727	1,304	668	662	3,094	865

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 13 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher prices to protect the environment.

	S. AFRICA	INDIA	PHILIPPINES	CHINA	THAILAND
Env. salience	0.080	-0.212*	-0.025	0.050	0.264*
	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.183)	(0.072)	(0.132)
Env. concern	0.066**	0.192***	-0.034	0.299***	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Institutional trust	0.034***	-0.086***	0.047**	0.052***	0.024
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.283***	-0.059	0.219**	0.136**	-0.173*
	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.050)	(0.070)
Social position	0.116***	-0.097***	0.061**	0.056***	0.093***
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.024)
Age	0.022*	-0.007	-0.018	0.010	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.069	-0.062	0.225**	0.072	-0.001
	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.046)	(0.064)
Education: secondary	0.101	-0.094	0.109	0.047	0.077
	(0.062)	(0.091)	(0.313)	(0.072)	(0.093)
Education: vocational	0.034	0.248	-0.117	0.110	0.235
	(0.108)	(0.593)	(0.143)	(0.072)	(0.123)
Education: tertiary	0.153	-0.151	0.002	0.139	0.285**
	(0.110)	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.101)
Living: big city	-0.156*	-0.094	0.308***		0.769***
	(0.078)	(0.101)	(0.085)		(0.119)
Living: suburbs	0.015	0.126	0.109		-0.214
	(0.069)	(0.161)	(0.144)		(0.156)
Living: small town	0.033	0.250**	0.204		0.017
	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.108)		(0.215)
Constant	1.248***	4.297***	2.132***	1.050***	2.078***
	(0.251)	(0.370)	(0.412)	(0.287)	(0.350)
R^2	0.08	0.14	0.05	0.10	0.16
N	2,345	1,081	1,238	1,975	1,035

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 14 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher prices to protect the environment.

	RUSSIA	SLOVAKIA	HUNGARY	CROATIA	LITHUANIA
Env. salience	0.272*	0.561***	0.126	0.480***	0.285**
	(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.137)	(0.099)
Env. concern	0.167***	0.317***	0.037	0.254***	0.223***
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Institutional trust	0.058***	0.051***	0.047***	0.085***	0.029*
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.101	0.160*	0.595***	0.244***	0.097
	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.066)
Social position	0.057**	0.103***	0.088***	0.040	0.119***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Age	-0.009	0.003	0.005	0.001	-0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.086	0.045	0.104	0.039	0.009
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.063)
Education: secondary	-0.087	-0.088	0.142	-0.168	0.009
	(0.195)	(0.135)	(0.093)	(0.159)	(0.114)
Education: vocational	0.030	-0.116	0.155	-0.121	0.170
	(0.182)	(0.282)	(0.153)	(0.233)	(0.124)
Education: tertiary	-0.083	0.051	0.378**	-0.083	0.144
	(0.189)	(0.143)	(0.128)	(0.177)	(0.121)
Living: big city	-0.015	-0.230*	-0.036	-0.138	0.180*
	(0.093)	(0.117)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.077)
Living: suburbs	0.220	-0.088	0.907***	-0.215	0.034
	(0.210)	(0.159)	(0.261)	(0.121)	(0.155)
Living: small town	0.029	0.107	0.048	0.215*	0.031
	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.081)
Constant	1.486***	0.250	0.925*	0.938*	0.753
	(0.407)	(0.389)	(0.467)	(0.373)	(0.390)
R^2	0.08	0.24	0.15	0.17	0.19
N	1,315	862	855	877	904

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 15 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher prices to protect the environment.

	ITALY	FRANCE	SPAIN	SLOVENIA	US	AUSTRIA
Env. salience	0.018	0.235**	0.348***	0.514***	0.318***	0.272***
	(0.107)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.116)	(0.064)	(0.082)
Env. concern	0.232***	0.409***	0.331***	0.319***	0.439***	0.334***
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.037)
Institutional trust	0.080***	0.041**	0.063***	0.045**	0.054***	0.049**
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.182*	0.141*	0.181**	0.007	0.041	-0.099
	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.085)
Social position	0.018	0.109***	0.090***	0.047*	0.014	0.163***
	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Age	-0.020	-0.019	-0.013	-0.011	-0.015	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.077	0.011	0.126*	-0.037	0.019	-0.073
	(0.080)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.067)
Education: secondary	0.211	0.071	-0.009	0.103	-0.092	0.071
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.081)	(0.145)	(0.112)	(0.127)
Education: vocational	-0.013	0.124	-0.001	0.357*	-0.131	0.260
	(0.423)	(0.126)	(0.087)	(0.169)	(0.130)	(0.143)
Education: tertiary	0.657***	0.208	0.122	0.353*	0.103	0.341*
	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.068)	(0.155)	(0.112)	(0.149)
Living: big city	-0.305**	0.023	0.026	-0.124	-0.004	-0.104
	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.086)
Living: suburbs	-0.344*	0.120	0.007	0.182	-0.123	-0.232
	(0.164)	(0.101)	(0.090)	(0.127)	(0.083)	(0.195)
Living: small town	-0.457***	-0.022	-0.002	-0.010	0.016	0.065
	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.167)	(0.080)
Constant	1.536***	1.013*	0.371	1.036**	1.489***	0.401
	(0.464)	(0.489)	(0.301)	(0.368)	(0.339)	(0.448)
R^2	0.16	0.24	0.20	0.20	0.34	0.21
N	847	928	1,423	784	1,396	996

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 16 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher prices to protect the environment.

	SOUTH KOREA	JAPAN	TAIWAN	GERMANY	NEW Z.	FINLAND
Env. salience	0.132*	0.046	0.139*	0.253***	0.358***	0.373***
	(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.078)
Env. concern	0.329***	0.221***	0.123***	0.427***	0.339***	0.358***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.033)
Institutional trust	-0.017	0.029*	0.028*	0.029*	0.074***	0.089***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.036	0.061	0.086	0.240***	0.069	0.229**
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.080)
Social position	0.032	0.047*	0.066***	0.068***	0.061**	0.041*
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Age	0.013	0.011	0.012	-0.019	0.007	-0.026
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.070	-0.137*	0.100	-0.068	-0.075	0.018
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.063)
Education: secondary	0.096	-0.020	0.251**	0.330*	-0.040	-0.177
	(0.075)	(0.128)	(0.091)	(0.153)	(0.142)	(0.146)
Education: vocational	0.228*	-0.096	0.443***	0.343*	-0.001	-0.008
	(0.103)	(0.141)	(0.114)	(0.165)	(0.126)	(0.145)
Education: tertiary	0.323***	0.125	0.523***	0.506**	0.092	0.061
	(0.091)	(0.138)	(0.100)	(0.155)	(0.128)	(0.149)
Living: big city	0.309***	0.281**	0.379***	0.084	-0.088	0.080
	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.082)	(0.138)	(0.112)
Living: suburbs	0.167	0.197*	0.317***	-0.021	-0.123	-0.051
	(0.098)	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.131)	(0.081)
Living: small town	0.149	0.016	0.327***	-0.027	-0.057	-0.117
	(0.100)	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.069)	(0.139)	(0.084)
Constant	1.206***	1.441***	0.982**	0.703*	0.525	1.145**
	(0.306)	(0.373)	(0.349)	(0.339)	(0.434)	(0.382)
R^2	0.17	0.11	0.09	0.29	0.22	0.32
N	1,070	998	1,446	1,217	671	901

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 17 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher prices to protect the environment.

	AUSTRALIA	SWEDEN	DENMARK	ICELAND	SWITZERLAND	NORWAY
Env. salience	0.419***	0.471***	0.576***	0.213*	0.261***	0.335***
	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.037)	(0.068)
Env. concern	0.453***	0.320***	0.380***	0.383***	0.384***	0.434***
	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Institutional trust	0.018	0.077***	0.048**	0.031	0.029**	0.069***
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.090	0.127	-0.015	0.289*	0.246***	0.290*
	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.112)	(0.128)	(0.042)	(0.115)
Social position	0.044	0.039*	0.052	0.037	0.092***	0.047*
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.020)
Age	-0.017	0.008	0.024	-0.031	-0.005	0.019
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Age squared	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000*	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.061	-0.001	-0.021	0.149	-0.007	0.046
	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Education: secondary	-0.079	-0.105	-0.028	0.312*	0.135*	0.115
	(0.125)	(0.097)	(0.176)	(0.144)	(0.060)	(0.146)
Education: vocational	0.068	-0.032	-0.163	0.109	0.191**	0.080
	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.200)	(0.166)	(0.072)	(0.155)
Education: tertiary	0.321**	0.004	-0.021	0.520***	0.267***	0.436**
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.180)	(0.148)	(0.065)	(0.145)
Living: big city	-0.002	0.010	0.140	-0.073	-0.093	-0.069
	(0.135)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.059)	(0.081)
Living: suburbs	-0.136	0.117	0.042	-0.145	0.007	-0.020
	(0.108)	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.136)	(0.053)	(0.103)
Living: small town	-0.155	0.015	-0.016	0.046	-0.081	0.056
	(0.115)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.142)	(0.042)	(0.084)
Constant	0.952	0.814*	0.222	1.051*	0.645**	-0.257
	(0.501)	(0.325)	(0.454)	(0.493)	(0.203)	(0.390)
R^2	0.34	0.29	0.31	0.23	0.24	0.39
N	727	1,304	668	662	3,094	865

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 18 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the environment.

	S. AFRICA	INDIA	PHILIPPINES	CHINA	THAILAND
Env. salience	0.205*	-0.043	0.194	0.091	0.174
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.178)	(0.075)	(0.133)
Env. concern	0.019	0.085**	-0.009	0.266***	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Institutional trust	0.060***	-0.074***	0.049***	0.067***	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.340***	0.060	0.257***	0.168**	-0.130
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.052)	(0.071)
Social position	0.100***	-0.068***	0.016	0.060***	0.108***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.024)
Age	0.024*	-0.016	-0.012	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000**	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.064	0.050	0.193**	0.175***	-0.009
	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Education: secondary	-0.027	-0.065	-0.172	-0.059	0.165
	(0.063)	(0.096)	(0.305)	(0.075)	(0.094)
Education: vocational	-0.211	-0.693	0.040	0.041	0.242
	(0.109)	(0.624)	(0.139)	(0.074)	(0.124)
Education: tertiary	-0.025	-0.307***	0.175*	0.035	0.341***
	(0.111)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.103)
Living: big city	-0.051	-0.110	0.316***		0.719***
	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.082)		(0.121)
Living: suburbs	0.032	0.174	-0.157		-0.331*
	(0.069)	(0.169)	(0.140)		(0.157)
Living: small town	0.017	0.166	0.021		0.034
	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.105)		(0.218)
Constant	1.237***	4.319***	1.904***	1.093***	1.763***
	(0.253)	(0.389)	(0.401)	(0.299)	(0.353)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.14
N	2,345	1,081	1,238	1,975	1,035

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 19 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the environment.

	RUSSIA	SLOVAKIA	HUNGARY	CROATIA	LITHUANIA
Env. salience	0.127	0.437***	0.163	0.436**	0.328**
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.135)	(0.100)
Env. concern	0.054*	0.278***	-0.049	0.214***	0.244***
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Institutional trust	0.066***	0.051***	0.031*	0.105***	0.043**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.072	0.161*	0.542***	0.147*	0.101
	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.067)
Social position	0.067***	0.102***	0.077***	0.032	0.102***
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Age	-0.005	0.006	0.034*	-0.011	-0.017
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.119	0.049	0.052	-0.028	0.070
	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.063)
Education: secondary	0.068	0.011	0.060	-0.116	-0.080
	(0.174)	(0.135)	(0.085)	(0.157)	(0.114)
Education: vocational	0.057	-0.466	0.287*	-0.184	0.154
	(0.162)	(0.282)	(0.141)	(0.230)	(0.125)
Education: tertiary	-0.080	0.118	0.176	-0.144	0.085
	(0.168)	(0.143)	(0.117)	(0.174)	(0.121)
Living: big city	0.030	-0.076	-0.162	-0.036	0.242**
	(0.083)	(0.117)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.078)
Living: suburbs	0.149	-0.245	0.441	-0.049	0.096
	(0.187)	(0.159)	(0.240)	(0.119)	(0.155)
Living: small town	-0.045	0.146	-0.020	0.156	0.137
	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.082)
Constant	1.251***	0.105	0.607	1.112**	0.861*
	(0.362)	(0.389)	(0.430)	(0.367)	(0.392)
R^2	0.07	0.21	0.13	0.15	0.21
N	1,315	862	855	877	904

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 20 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the environment.

	ITALY	FRANCE	SPAIN	SLOVENIA	US	AUSTRIA
Env. salience	0.068	0.391***	0.431***	0.685***	0.378***	0.184*
	(0.098)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.127)	(0.070)	(0.083)
Env. concern	0.133***	0.337***	0.303***	0.265***	0.474***	0.294***
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Institutional trust	0.104***	0.091***	0.075***	0.079***	0.078***	0.044**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Trust in people	0.294***	0.264***	0.220***	0.099	0.086	0.026
	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.086)
Social position	0.015	0.066**	0.069***	0.027	-0.018	0.115***
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Age	-0.018	-0.034	0.003	-0.009	-0.032*	-0.011
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.001	-0.085	0.108*	0.014	0.064	0.080
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.068)
Education: secondary	0.255*	0.095	0.074	0.271	-0.046	0.159
	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.085)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.129)
Education: vocational	0.312	0.166	0.068	0.525**	-0.172	0.218
	(0.387)	(0.133)	(0.091)	(0.186)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Education: tertiary	0.661***	0.166	0.164*	0.484**	0.113	0.354*
	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.071)	(0.170)	(0.123)	(0.151)
Living: big city	-0.214*	0.083	0.097	-0.145	-0.007	-0.058
	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.073)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.087)
Living: suburbs	-0.057	0.150	0.006	0.205	-0.103	-0.207
	(0.150)	(0.107)	(0.094)	(0.139)	(0.091)	(0.198)
Living: small town	-0.249**	0.049	0.062	0.034	-0.027	0.044
	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.087)	(0.183)	(0.081)
Constant	1.188**	0.840	-0.061	0.576	1.540***	0.700
	(0.425)	(0.519)	(0.313)	(0.405)	(0.371)	(0.453)
R^2	0.18	0.25	0.20	0.19	0.35	0.15
N	847	928	1,423	784	1,396	996

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 21 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the environment.

	SOUTH KOREA	JAPAN	TAIWAN	GERMANY	NEW Z.	FINLAND
Env. salience	0.140*	0.172*	0.109	0.354***	0.376***	0.499***
	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.093)	(0.083)
Env. concern	0.271***	0.248***	0.080*	0.356***	0.370***	0.337***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.036)
Institutional trust	-0.013	0.041**	0.038**	0.064***	0.129***	0.121***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.072	0.093	0.137*	0.183**	0.106	0.230**
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.086)
Social position	0.057**	0.074***	0.046*	0.041*	0.044	-0.011
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Age	0.018	-0.011	-0.004	-0.011	0.001	-0.043**
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.074	0.009	0.156**	-0.016	-0.017	0.041
	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.067)
Education: secondary	0.084	0.058	0.135	0.188	-0.022	-0.095
	(0.081)	(0.137)	(0.092)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.156)
Education: vocational	0.280*	0.090	0.360**	0.262	-0.032	0.046
	(0.111)	(0.150)	(0.115)	(0.164)	(0.133)	(0.155)
Education: tertiary	0.350***	0.381**	0.342***	0.439**	0.179	0.172
	(0.099)	(0.147)	(0.101)	(0.155)	(0.134)	(0.159)
Living: big city	0.203*	0.166	0.450***	0.230**	-0.352*	0.195
	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.081)	(0.145)	(0.120)
Living: suburbs	0.074	0.227*	0.400***	0.191*	-0.160	0.063
	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.137)	(0.086)
Living: small town	0.086	0.098	0.311***	0.059	-0.030	-0.018
	(0.108)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.069)	(0.146)	(0.090)
Constant	0.954**	0.603	1.336***	0.177	0.200	1.250**
	(0.332)	(0.397)	(0.353)	(0.337)	(0.456)	(0.408)
R^2	0.13	0.17	0.08	0.30	0.28	0.34
N	1,070	998	1,446	1,217	671	901

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 22 Probability of increased willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the environment.

	AUSTRALIA	SWEDEN	DENMARK	ICELAND	SWITZERLAND	NORWAY
Env. salience	0.515***	0.614***	0.627***	0.426***	0.364***	0.303***
	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.040)	(0.076)
Env. concern	0.425***	0.298***	0.361***	0.404***	0.386***	0.422***
	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.036)
Institutional trust	-0.010	0.124***	0.067***	0.031	0.063***	0.089***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Trust in people	0.163	0.226**	0.082	0.540***	0.284***	0.311*
	(0.088)	(0.075)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.045)	(0.128)
Social position	0.030	-0.009	-0.001	0.010	0.082***	0.028
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.023)
Age	-0.038*	0.010	0.013	-0.032	-0.009	-0.007
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.032	-0.012	-0.099	0.161	-0.018	0.008
	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.038)	(0.069)
Education: secondary	-0.058	-0.051	-0.032	0.096	0.117	0.101
	(0.134)	(0.104)	(0.198)	(0.153)	(0.065)	(0.162)
Education: vocational	0.054	-0.081	-0.312	-0.099	0.159*	0.129
	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.224)	(0.176)	(0.078)	(0.172)
Education: tertiary	0.407***	0.060	-0.071	0.306	0.338***	0.645***
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.202)	(0.157)	(0.070)	(0.161)
Living: big city	0.119	0.072	0.257*	0.028	0.077	-0.085
	(0.145)	(0.079)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.063)	(0.090)
Living: suburbs	-0.044	0.058	0.036	0.004	0.098	-0.010
	(0.116)	(0.082)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.058)	(0.115)
Living: small town	0.002	0.023	0.041	0.056	0.001	0.035
	(0.124)	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.150)	(0.046)	(0.093)
Constant	1.303*	0.545	0.431	0.604	-0.189	-0.065
	(0.538)	(0.347)	(0.510)	(0.523)	(0.220)	(0.434)
R^2	0.34	0.34	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.37
N	727	1,304	668	662	3,094	865

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 23 Probability of increased willingness to accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment.

	S. AFRICA	INDIA	PHILIPPINES	CHINA	THAILAND
Env. salience	0.098	-0.108	-0.092	0.203**	0.396**
	(0.089)	(0.082)	(0.184)	(0.076)	(0.141)
Env. concern	0.050*	0.149***	-0.058	0.214***	0.131***
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Institutional trust	0.053***	-0.061***	0.032*	0.038**	0.076***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.348***	0.181**	-0.125	0.024	-0.353***
	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.075)
Social position	0.101***	-0.104***	0.031	0.013	0.049
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.026)
Age	0.026*	-0.001	-0.007	-0.001	-0.014
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000**	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	-0.004	-0.008	0.011	0.094	0.069
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.068)
Education: secondary	0.007	-0.022	-0.248	-0.119	0.148
	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.315)	(0.077)	(0.100)
Education: vocational	-0.039	-0.705	-0.029	0.065	0.014
	(0.108)	(0.578)	(0.144)	(0.076)	(0.131)
Education: tertiary	-0.095	-0.052	-0.176*	-0.174*	0.136
	(0.109)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.108)
Living: big city	-0.076	0.134	0.233**		-0.683***
	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.085)		(0.128)
Living: suburbs	0.004	0.104	-0.097		-0.052
	(0.068)	(0.157)	(0.145)		(0.166)
Living: small town	0.023	0.285***	-0.011		-0.198
	(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.109)		(0.230)
Constant	1.079***	3.929***	2.857***	1.675***	2.076***
	(0.249)	(0.361)	(0.415)	(0.304)	(0.373)
R^2	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.05	0.10
N	2,345	1,081	1,238	1,975	1,035

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 24 Probability of increased willingness to accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment.

	RUSSIA	SLOVAKIA	HUNGARY	CROATIA	LITHUANIA
Env. salience	0.038	0.583***	0.362**	0.386**	0.449***
	(0.148)	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.144)	(0.104)
Env. concern	0.210***	0.335***	-0.039	0.182***	0.189***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Institutional trust	0.024	0.033*	-0.012	0.083***	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.125	0.221**	0.476***	0.156*	0.040
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.070)
Social position	0.034	0.128***	0.039	0.056*	0.104***
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Age	-0.005	0.006	0.028	0.018	-0.020
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.171*	0.005	-0.043	0.026	0.013
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Education: secondary	0.078	0.006	0.134	0.079	-0.045
	(0.214)	(0.139)	(0.088)	(0.168)	(0.120)
Education: vocational	0.271	-0.018	0.096	-0.145	0.007
	(0.199)	(0.291)	(0.145)	(0.247)	(0.130)
Education: tertiary	0.235	0.166	0.211	0.044	-0.060
	(0.207)	(0.147)	(0.121)	(0.187)	(0.127)
Living: big city	0.134	-0.199	-0.091	-0.123	-0.045
	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.081)
Living: suburbs	0.478*	0.079	0.415	-0.132	0.365*
	(0.230)	(0.164)	(0.246)	(0.128)	(0.162)
Living: small town	-0.022	0.049	0.064	0.134	-0.074
	(0.108)	(0.079)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.085)
Constant	1.550***	0.078	1.290**	0.612	1.384***
	(0.445)	(0.401)	(0.441)	(0.395)	(0.410)
R^2	0.06	0.27	0.10	0.11	0.12
N	1,315	862	855	877	904

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 25 Probability of increased willingness to accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment.

	ITALY	FRANCE	SPAIN	SLOVENIA	US	AUSTRIA
Env. salience	0.209*	0.388***	0.479***	0.440***	0.264***	0.266***
	(0.106)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.118)	(0.067)	(0.080)
Env. concern	0.161***	0.417***	0.372***	0.278***	0.516***	0.410***
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Institutional trust	0.060***	0.037*	0.059***	0.027	0.050***	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.166*	0.215**	0.163**	0.083	0.044	0.098
	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.083)
Social position	-0.020	0.041	0.085***	0.007	-0.020	0.047*
	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Age	-0.006	-0.021	0.001	0.014	-0.013	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.030	-0.110	-0.031	-0.206**	0.046	0.021
	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.066)
Education: secondary	0.095	0.194	0.139	0.161	-0.111	0.203
	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.086)	(0.148)	(0.116)	(0.124)
Education: vocational	0.052	0.217	0.100	0.240	-0.264	0.280*
	(0.419)	(0.131)	(0.092)	(0.172)	(0.135)	(0.140)
Education: tertiary	0.411**	0.205	0.236**	0.039	0.021	0.337*
	(0.133)	(0.128)	(0.072)	(0.158)	(0.117)	(0.145)
Living: big city	-0.374***	-0.104	-0.007	-0.088	-0.019	-0.323***
	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.084)
Living: suburbs	-0.169	0.067	-0.043	0.197	-0.049	-0.503**
	(0.162)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.129)	(0.086)	(0.191)
Living: small town	-0.386***	-0.052	0.076	-0.081	-0.021	-0.008
	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.174)	(0.078)
Constant	1.967***	1.374**	0.160	1.447***	1.253***	0.829
	(0.460)	(0.510)	(0.318)	(0.376)	(0.352)	(0.437)
R^2	0.11	0.23	0.21	0.14	0.35	0.19
N	847	928	1,423	784	1,396	996

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 26 Probability of increased willingness to accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment.

	SOUTH KOREA	JAPAN	TAIWAN	GERMANY	NEW Z.	FINLAND
Env. salience	0.060	0.142	0.098	0.298***	0.259**	0.355***
	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.095)	(0.074)
Env. concern	0.208***	0.247***	0.138***	0.384***	0.368***	0.398***
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.032)
Institutional trust	-0.014	0.030	-0.003	0.016	0.062**	0.043**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Trust in people	0.020	0.080	0.189**	0.221***	-0.024	0.259***
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.102)	(0.077)
Social position	0.029	-0.019	-0.022	0.035*	0.014	-0.012
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Age	0.024	0.007	0.011	0.000	-0.000	-0.019
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Age squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.012	0.031	-0.058	-0.059	-0.073	-0.156*
	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.084)	(0.060)
Education: secondary	0.059	0.011	0.070	0.200	0.002	-0.130
	(0.084)	(0.145)	(0.089)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.140)
Education: vocational	0.040	0.028	0.336**	0.186	-0.036	-0.036
	(0.115)	(0.159)	(0.112)	(0.160)	(0.136)	(0.139)
Education: tertiary	0.192	0.164	0.357***	0.310*	0.082	-0.013
	(0.102)	(0.155)	(0.098)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.142)
Living: big city	0.209*	0.112	0.158	-0.030	-0.235	-0.004
	(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.148)	(0.107)
Living: suburbs	0.151	0.061	0.168	-0.003	-0.166	-0.081
	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.141)	(0.077)
Living: small town	0.193	-0.030	0.187*	0.039	-0.261	-0.052
	(0.112)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.067)	(0.150)	(0.081)
Constant	1.212***	1.018*	2.088***	1.246***	1.201*	1.816***
	(0.343)	(0.421)	(0.342)	(0.328)	(0.467)	(0.366)
R^2	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.24	0.18	0.31
N	1,070	998	1,446	1,217	671	901

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Table A 27 Probability of increased willingness to accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment.

	AUSTRALIA	SWEDEN	DENMARK	ICELAND	SWITZERLAND	NORWAY
Env. salience	0.512***	0.465***	0.387***	0.337***	0.206***	0.396***
	(0.087)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.034)	(0.073)
Env. concern	0.415***	0.406***	0.351***	0.474***	0.353***	0.379***
	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.035)
Institutional trust	-0.004	0.033**	0.041*	0.019	0.006	0.047**
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Trust in people	0.032	0.105	-0.063	0.385**	0.182***	0.258*
	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.114)	(0.124)	(0.038)	(0.123)
Social position	0.032	-0.023	-0.005	0.016	0.007	0.009
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Age	-0.026	0.026*	0.001	-0.031	-0.004	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Age squared	0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender (male)	0.012	-0.056	-0.087	0.027	-0.117***	-0.104
	(0.075)	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.032)	(0.066)
Education: secondary	0.215	0.052	0.145	0.187	0.129*	0.383*
	(0.129)	(0.097)	(0.179)	(0.140)	(0.054)	(0.156)
Education: vocational	0.028	0.208	0.031	0.119	0.228***	0.470**
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.202)	(0.160)	(0.066)	(0.165)
Education: tertiary	0.406***	0.142	0.217	0.332*	0.184**	0.654***
	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.182)	(0.143)	(0.059)	(0.155)
Living: big city	-0.140	-0.040	0.150	-0.024	-0.055	-0.286***
	(0.139)	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.053)	(0.086)
Living: suburbs	-0.175	0.002	0.114	-0.020	0.034	-0.133
	(0.112)	(0.077)	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.048)	(0.110)
Living: small town	-0.177	-0.014	0.018	0.031	-0.034	-0.094
	(0.119)	(0.072)	(0.101)	(0.137)	(0.038)	(0.089)
Constant	1.592**	0.879**	1.274**	1.084*	2.035***	0.517
	(0.517)	(0.324)	(0.460)	(0.476)	(0.185)	(0.417)
R^2	0.34	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.19	0.31
N	727	1,304	668	662	3,094	865

Standard error in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Reference categories: Education: compulsory only, Place of living: village/countryside

Figure A 5 Prioritise future environment. Explanatory power of models across countries



Figure A 6 Willingness to pay much higher prices. Explanatory power of models across countries



Figure A 7 Willingness to pay much higher taxes. Explanatory power of models across countries



Figure A 8 Willingness to accept cuts in standard of living. Explanatory power of models across countries



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